Analisis ekonomi politik swasembada gula Indonesia: kombinasi model oligopolistik dinamik dan fungsi preferensi politik
Political economy of the Indonesian sugar self sufficiency: a combination approach of dynamic oligopolistic model and political preference function
Abstract
Sugar industry is among the most developed agricultural industry in Indonesia but it is highly regulated by the government. As regulations create economic rents, many interested parties compete for the rents and involve in rent seeking activities. This paper aims at estimating the economic rents in Indonesia sugar industry and measuring the potential social costs of rent seeking since rents are dissipated through rent seeking activities. In addition, it also tests the relationship between producers’ political lobby on self sufficiency rate and the size of rent obtained. Results show that during 2003-2009 protection on sugar industry has created Dead Weight Loss and the economic rent consecutively as large as Rp. 129 billion and Rp. 6.9 trillion annually. Moreover most of the rent went to the government/state (32.7%) and the rest were collected by importers (20.5%), private sugar mills (16.1%), and local traders (15.3%). Ironically sugar cane farmers only receive 15.4 % of the rents. Since rents were dissipated through rent seeking activities, the social cost of sugar protection would be Rp. 7.1 trillion per annum or approximately 34.41 percent of the value of sugar consumption that achieved Rp. 20.8 trillion. Furthermore, the results indicate that these welfare losses are positively associated with producers’ political lobby/pressure and negatively related to self sufficiency rate. Consequently, in order to minimize rent seeking activities the government should not concentrate on pursuing self sufficiency but rather on removing inefficiencies in sugar industry especially those operating in Java. Without that self sufficiency is simply becoming an arena for rent seeking activities. Pergulaan merupakan salah satu industri pertanian yang paling maju dan paling lengkap di Indonesia, mulai dari research and development hingga industri pengolahannya. Sejumlah regulasi yang mengatur harga, distribusi, perdagangan luar negeri hingga penetapan jumlah dan nama importir dikeluarkan. Tujuannya adalah mendorong industri gula sebagai industri pertanian strategis yang berperan meningkatkan ketahanan pangan, kesempatan kerja, dan pertumbuhan pendapatan. Karena perannya yang strategis itu pula maka setiap rezim pemerintah berusaha meningkatkan produksi gula. Selain itu struktur pasar gula dunia ditandai dengan rasio konsentrasi eksportir lebih besar dari importir, mengindikasikan volatilitas harga gula dunia sangat ditentukan oleh goncangan pada sisi penawaran. Struktur pasar gula dunia yang demikian merupakan justifikasi logis bagi negara importir termasuk Indonesia untuk mengejar swasembada gula. Dengan demikian dari sudut pandang teori kepentingan publik (Public Interest Theory), dimana pemerintah berperan sebagai agen pelayanan publik, intervensi pemerintah pada industri gula dilakukan untuk mengatasi kegagalan pasar demi mencapai Pareto Improvement. Teori kepentingan publik ini merupakan pendekatan yang paling banyak digunakan di negara berkembang, termasuk Indonesia, dalam menjelaskan peran regulatif pemerintah terutama jika dikaitkan dengan alasan historis ketika sistim pasar gagal menciptakan distribusi pendapatan yang lebih merata. Argumentasi pemerintah ini tidak pernah dipertanyakan dan hingga sekarang masih menjadi landasan berpikir kebanyakan peneliti pergulaan Indonesia.
