Towards a Sound Financial Architecture for Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of National Forest Funds

Meeting on Strengthening Financing for SFM through National Forest Funds


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ABSTRACT

In order for the forestry fund to have substantial meaning, the fundamental factors that inhibit the forestry business must be removed first. Although public investment of the reforestation fund (DR) is quite large, the overall productivity of the land developed for industrial plantation forest has failed to achieve the targets set. Two internal factors that need to be addressed are (1) the property rights issue and (2) timber price, which are very crucial for long-term investments. Only when forestry investment is attractive, will funds flow to the forestry sector. If forestry investment is not profitable, then the forestry fund will only be wasted and there will be no sustainable production forest.

Keywords: Dana reboisasi (DR), Natural forest, Royalty, Incentive, Profitable, Sustainable

OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND OF THE FUND

In accordance with the constitution, natural resources are used for the maximum benefit of the people in a sustainable manner. To ensure that such a use can be materialized, the productivity of the forest must be maintained; any degradation must be addressed, including by conducting reforestation. To ensure that reforestation can be implemented, the availability of funds dedicated to reforestation must be maintained. This is the background of Indonesia's forestry fund called DR. Although public investment of DR is quite large, the overall productivity of the land developed for industrial plantation forest has failed to achieve the targets set. Two internal factors that need to be addressed are property rights issue and timber price.

In Government Regulation 6 of 2007, DR is defined as a fund collected from IUPHHK holders in natural production forest to reforest and rehabilitate forests extensively damaged by illegal logging. It is true, the initial money of DR was from the money of DJR. DJR was money that belongs to holders of forest concession right that must be deposited in the government’s account as a performance guarantee of reforestation on their logged over areas. As time went by, DJR at the hand of the government built up because very few holders of forest concession who performed reforestation. Furthermore, the government through the Presidential Decree No 31 of 1989 regarding DR cancelled the Presidential Decree No 35 of 1980 and altered DJR to DR with all consequences. The Presidential Decree No 31 of 1989 clearly mandates that every holder of forest utilization license as referred to in Article 27 and Article 29, subject to business license fees, fees, DRs, and performance bonds. In essence, DR is government revenue earmarked.

The legal status of the DR from 1989 to 1999 was not clear, whether or not it was the state revenue. Logically, revenues are grouped into two categories, namely in the form of tax revenue and non-tax state revenues because inclusion of DR as a non-tax revenues lately occurred through Government Regulation No. 92 of 1999. Prior to 1999 the DR was off-budget, since 1999 the fund has been large amounts of idle money certainly made many government bureaucrats tempt to use. It follows the characteristic of bureaucracy that tends to maximize the budget (Niskanen, 1968).

Prior to 1999 the DR was off-budget, since 1999 the fund has been on-budget. Large amounts of idle money certainly made many government bureaucrats tempt to use it. It follows the characteristic of bureaucracy that tends to maximize the budget (Niskanen, 1968).

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

DR is collected from royalties charged on timber harvested from natural forests. DR rate depends on the wood species, size, and location (Table 1). Largest revenue comes from Meranti and mixed timbers, revenues from logs of ebony, natural teak, fancy wood, and sandalwood are very minor because the production of those timbers is also very low. Revenue per year of DR is presented in Table 2.

Table 1: Tariff of Reforestation Fund (USD per cubic meter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>Kalimantan-Maluku</th>
<th>Sumatera-Sulawesi</th>
<th>Papua-NT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meranti</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebony</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fancy wood</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandal wood</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>19.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government Regulation No. 92/1999

Revenue from lease of land is also included to generate ideas that there are other revenue sources, such as land rent, that can be used for reforestation. Land lease is generally associated with mining operations. Former mining areas need to be rehabilitated in order to make it productive for agriculture. Whether or not the rate of land lease is already efficient still needs to be studied further.

Table 2: Receipt of reforestation fund (x1000 IDR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>Land Rent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,338,335,810.19</td>
<td>169,797,334.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,406,159,304.60</td>
<td>162,231,506.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,430,054,128.98</td>
<td>432,550,625.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,721,221,417.26</td>
<td>403,865,794.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate General of BUK

Annual revenue of DR tends to decline over time due to lower production of logs from natural forest. DR revenue in average is about 1.5 trillion IDR per year. The figures in Table 2 are not always consistent with the level of timber production in Figure 1 due to revenue of DR within a year does not always come from timber harvested during the year in question. Some DR received in a year may be as a payment against the outstanding AR in previous years.
Other sources are still limited to the discourse, such as REDD+ funds and funds from carbon trading. Practice of payment for environmental services on a small scale has begun to occur, such as in Cidanau-Banten, between Cirebon and Kuningan local governments, and in Mataram NTB. Money paid by users of environmental services, at least, can help producers of environmental services to conserve forests in the upstream. Actually there is another important source, namely banking. For example, Bank Mandiri has shown its interest to help finance investments in forest plantations. But excessive regulation in the forestry industry makes the industry less attractive for investment (Kartodihardjo and Soedomo, 2011).

**FUND UTILIZATION**

The use of DR during the New Order era was almost without clear criteria, except closeness to the power. Activities that supported the rehabilitation of land could also be financed by DR, but the definition of the supporting activities was not very clear. Oversight of the use of DR also practically non-existent. The central government controlled fully the revenue and the use of DR. The situation changed after the New Order regime collapsed.

According to the government regulation No. 35 of 2002, DR shall be divided as follows: a. 40% (forty percent) for the producing region and b. 60% (sixty percent) for the Central Government. The DR of central government is allocated to the Technical Department (MoFor) and the remaining is allocated to the Forest Development Account (RPH, Rekening Pembangunan Hutan) . Some of the DR has been placed on Public Service Board-Forest Development Funding Board (BLU-BPPH, Badan Layanan Umum-Badan Pembiayaan Pembangunan Hutan), a financial management agency, to help finance the development of plantations. BLU-BPPH must report the implementation of its activities, including financial management, to the MoFor.

Under management of BLU-BPPH, DR is directed to assist the development of plantation, particularly private plantations and small-scale forests. Loans to small-scale forests and private forest owners have started running and welcomed, as is the case in Wonosobo and Blora. Loans that have been given begins with application of a farmer group. After an investigation in the field, when the application is approved, the contract is for each farmer individually, not as a group. However, HTR development still face obstacles in the form of licensing procedures, which are very complicated. Ban on HTR development also took place due to the industry less attractive for investment (Kartodihardjo and Soedomo, 2011).
Before 1999, the use of DR was practically not audited. Since 1999, the use of DR must have been audited by the Supreme Audit Board (BPK). A central feature of the DR during the Suharto period was that these funds were not flowing into the state treasury to be included in the annual budget of the government, but incorporated as state off-budget funds managed directly by the MoFor (Ascher, 1999).

On 5 February 2007, the Minister of Forestry and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued a regulation on the establishment of Forest Development Account (RPH) to support the use of DR in forest and land rehabilitation. RPH initial capital was granted in September 2007 amounting to 5.0 trillion IDR and was administered by the Ministry of Finance.

Financial control over RPH is conducted by the Director General of the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance obligations to prepare and submit a five-year work plan, along with a budget detailing the objectives of utilization of the fund. Once approved, the Ministry of Finance will send funds from RPH to the 'working unit' of the MoFor who is responsible for the expenditure of the fund for forestry development.

'Working Unit' of the MoFor in charge of managing DR as a 'revolving fund.' This unit is allowed to provide a variety of loans to a number of legal entities - state or privately owned - as well as to groups of cooperatives, which are required to have business licenses in forest utilization (IUPHT, izin usaha pemanfaatan hasil hutan) and expertise in the field of forestry. The legal entities should have not been involved in any bad activities related to finance. If a legal entity fails to pay back the loan, then the debtor may be subject to a penalty of 2 percent of the principal each year along with its interest. For groups and cooperatives of farmers, if they fail to pay back the loan then the debtor may be sanctioned collectively, which is not specified.

On 2 March 2007, the Minister of Finance announced the creation of BLU-BPPH, which would serve as a 'working unit' of the Ministry of Forestry that is responsible for the expenditure of the fund for forestry development expenditure. Establishment of BLU-BPPH aims to create a more flexible financing institutions in disbursing funds but more reliable in financial management. Since BLU-BPPH is in early stage, we do not have enough information to make a fair evaluation of its performance.

**KEYSTAKERS**

Some parties have influence and are influenced by forestry funds, particularly forestry fund in the form of DR which is a state revenue. The fund management must be accountable to all the people, not only to those who contributed and who use it. As mentioned previously, the beneficiaries of DR in the past were mainly large-scale plantation companies, especially those who close to the center of power. Since the reform era, the target beneficiaries of the fund have changed slightly toward smaller scale agents of plantation forest.

Lately, there is a discourse to finance the rehabilitation of natural forests, particularly in relation to the application of intensive sylviculture. According to existing rules, any investment in natural forests, the results of the investment belong to the government. As a result, there are no private parties who are willing to make long-term investments in natural forest land. As a way out, several parties suggested that agents who apply the intensive sylviculture are exempted from the obligation to pay...
What could be achieved by DR was not much. Although public investment of DR was quite large, the overall performance of the land developed for HTI has failed to achieve the targets set. Several years ago, the government gave the loan, which was sourced from the DR, to some companies of industrial plantation with zero percent interest, but the forests in question did not materialize and many loans have not been returned. Worse, there is a suggestion to abolish the loan in default.

The number of companies that were willing to undertake rehabilitation was very little. They prefer to give up the money that has been handed over to the government than to rehabilitate the forests and get the money back. This suggests that the levy rate set by the government was too low. There are indications that the same thing happens in the case of post-mining reclamation funds.

Indonesian experience shows that transparency and accountability are critical components of good financial governance. To a certain extent, DR abuses during the New Order were facilitated by non-standard accounting systems and weak supervision by the MoFor over DR account. So, it is important to involve institutions that have the power of law in dealing with financial oversight, such as BPK and KPK (Commission on Corruption Eradication). The absence of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms has led to a large number of DR lost to fraud, diversion to other uses and wasted.

Without the help of financial institutions, private forest in Java Island has grown up to 2.8 million hectares and has contributed to the development of private forest in Java: clarity of rights, timber prices, transportation infrastructure, and population demographics. What happens in Java could provide very valuable lessons that could be replicated outside Java where idle lands are still widespread.

Is it true that the forest is experiencing a shortage of funds for investment? Is not a lack of applicants who want to invest? Is the forest an unattractive place for investment? I am afraid that the problem of the slow development of forests, especially outside Java, is not caused by a shortage of funds for investment, but by the lack of clarity about the rights, low timber prices, and limited transportation infrastructure. Once upon a time, President Harry S. Truman said: "If I had to choose between one-handed economists! All my economists say: On the one hand, on the other…"

The same thing is experienced by the individuals working in forestry-related fields in Indonesia. On the one hand, they want to keep forestry funds available for investment, but on the other hand they also make forestry less attractive for investment. In the upstream, many barriers with respect to licensing that must be faced by entrepreneurs. In the downstream, selling timber from a long investment is exposed very low timber prices due to government policies that distort the market of logs. Forestry business in Indonesia can be summarized as "chocked in the upstream and clogged in the downstream." But it is expected to remain healthy.

Identifying the real problem is very important because with it we can design the use of forestry funds more effectively and efficiently. On land that is not forested there are certainly human activities, which often involve tenurial conflicts. Is it the better way to spend money from the forestry fund in a case like this to resolve conflicts that may arise over tenure or to purchase seed? If there is no interference by other human activities, then the bare land will be covered quickly by vegetation through natural succession. We do not need to waste money for planting trees if the property rights remain unclear, but on the other hand we expect sustainability of forests is maintained. The intersection between the two is an empty set. Property rights offers incentives for long-term
In particular, making land rights more secure and transferable would promote incentive for investment and efficient use of resources. There are three reasons supporting this conventional view.

First, secure rights are believed to provide a guarantee to farmers the benefits from their investments will certainly flow to them and will not be appropriated by other agents. As a result, long-term investment is encouraged (Besley, 1995; Deininger and Jin, 2006). Therefore, it makes sense to invest in land, since it does not lose value in the long run.

Second, capitalization of asset with more secure property rights is more probable. According to Feder and Onchan (1987), security of ownership improves chances of obtaining loans to finance agricultural investments. Secure property rights reduce the uncertainty for the lender and provides the basis for using land as a collateral asset.

Third, secure tenure rights would allow farmers to devote their productive resources to agriculture, rather than to protect their holdings against expropriation by other agents.

According to national forest plans, production forest that is allocated for large scale is 43.6 million hectares while for small scale is 5.5 million hectares. Does this mean that maintaining forests is tantamount to maintaining the injustice? Is justice not an important element of sustainability? So, how can we be used to fix the injustice or to plant trees? There is no need to maintain forest if it does not deliver welfare to the people.

The most sustainable and reliable source of forestry fund should be the forest itself. To achieve this, the forestry business in Indonesia is generally less profitable. Currently, the forestry business in Indonesia is generally less profitable. In the past few years, the government has invested money in the forestry sector. Even the money that is available today will run out eventually.

Sustainability of DR is very difficult to maintain due to the decline in the ability of natural forests to produce timber. The government has to find alternative sources of funding to sustain forest fund. In addition, the rate of return on investment is also a major concern. Differences between the domestic market and international market have to be considered. Differences between the domestic market and international market can reach 220 USD per cubic meter. With prices at the international market, the difference will likely be utilized. The government can allocates 8 trillion IDR to forestry fund then every year there is an additional 4 trillion IDR. But there is a risk, the destruction of natural forests. The reason is that property rights to natural forests are not clear.

Payments for environmental services can be considered as a source of forestry fund. It is still in early stage of development. We need to explore it further. A partnership between local water companies (PDAM, Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum) and farmers in protected forests in Mataram Lombok can be a good example (Soedomo and Nugroho, 2009). PDAM Menang Mataram has allocated 850 million IDR in 2011 to fund conservation and to provide assistance to communities and villages around the spring16.

Let us take a look the economy of Indonesia, particularly its fiscal policy. So far, the importance of forest is still limited in a seminar room. Meanwhile, burning fossil fuel is much more important so that the government needs to support it. The figures in Table 3 say a lot about budget allocations to subsidy for activities that potentially add CO2 in the air is much larger than the one allocated to support CO2 reduction from the air. In 2006, the fuel subsidy was 64.2 trillion IDR, while the government allocated 2.7 trillion IDR.
Environmental protection budget rose to 10.1 trillion rupiah in 2011, but at the same time fuel subsidy jumped to 129.7 trillion rupiah. In addition, two government institutions that are frequently associated with environmental protection, namely MoFor and Ministry of the Environment (MoE), received annual budget, in total, of 1.8 trillion lOR in 2006 and 7.0 trillion lOR in 2011. Reallocation of state budget by reducing fuel subsidy to increase budget related to environment and forestry could be an important source of forestry fund.

Table 3: Pro (+) and contra (-) forces of co-emission (trillions IDR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel subsidy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>139.1</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>123.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Env. protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoFor</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Finance

REFERENCES


