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**STRUGGLE OVER ACCESS, CONTROL AND USE FOR DONGI-DONGI
AREA OF THE LORE LINDU NATIONAL PARK, CENTRAL SULAWESI:
A POLITICAL ECOLOGY PERSPECTIVE**

Soeryo Adiwibowo¹

Abstract

In this paper the Dongi-Dongi case is analyzed through the political ecology approach, with reference to theoretical considerations of the concept of "political actor". This study shows that all the actors involved in Dongi-Dongi – either the central government, the local government, the local and international based NGOs, community organizations, customary communities, and economic institutions related to illegal logging - directly or indirectly, with varying degrees of involvement - contributed to the Dongi-Dongi controversy. Conservation policy failures and the government's weak commitment to solving agrarian problems, as well as the political interests of the local and international NGOs, were among the political factors outside of the village community that triggered the Dongi-Dongi occupation. The economic forces exacerbating the conflict were the high demand for logs at sawmills and wood shops, most of which operated illegally in Palu valley, as well as corruption and collusion. All of these factors worked together to accelerate the incidence of Dongi-Dongi occupation.

Keywords : political interest, political resources, non-governmental organizations, park zoning

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Introduction

This paper attempts to discuss and analyze the background, process and impact of the occupation of the Dongi-Dongi area in the Core Zone of the Lore Lindu National Park by landless farmers from the Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat villages, who received support from local

¹ Lecturer at Agriculture Socio-Economic Department, Faculty of Agriculture, Bogor Agriculture Institute. This article is based on the Ph.D field research conducted under the framework of Research Project on Stability of Rainforest Margins (STORMA), a long term collaborative research project between Göttingen University, Kassel University, Bogor Agriculture Institute and Tadulako University, Central Sulawesi.

NGOs: Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and People's Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Bantuan Hukum Rakyat: YBHR). In order to provide a clear and sharp description of the situation, this paper has been written utilizing the political ecology approach introduced by Bryant and Bailey (1997). There are two main reasons that the political ecology framework is an appropriate approach to analysing the Dongi-Dongi case: (1) The Dongi-Dongi problem is an outcome of the interaction of actors operating in a context of unequal power relations; (2) the Dongi-Dongi controversy is not simply a reflection of political and market failures, but rather a manifestation of broader political and economic forces.

Based on the above, this working paper is focused on seeking answers to the following questions: What is the background of the Dongi-Dongi case? What was the process carried out by all of the concerned parties in acting to resolve the Dongi-Dongi problem? Who had the most powerful influence in changing the environmental condition of Dongi-Dongi? Who was most advantaged and disadvantaged in the Dongi-Dongi case?

This paper was written on the basis of field observations to the Dongi-Dongi location and in-depth interviews with the various parties involved over a period from March to September 2002. The research activities and data analysis on the topic of Dongi-Dongi constituted an ongoing process at the time this paper was written and published. The main sources of facts and information for the writing of this paper are email records, official letters, seminar and discussion papers, newspaper articles, press releases, photographs, and anonymous letters. The facts gleaned from these sources provide a picture of the events as they unfolded, as well as the motives, views, positions and actions taken by the various actors/parties involved in the Dongi-Dongi case.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the history of Lore Lindu National Park (including the Dongi-Dongi area) and the role of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (*Balai Taman Nasional Lore Lindu: BTNLL*). Section 3 outlines the history, purpose, function and influence of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority. Section 4 provides a profile of the farmers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia & Rahmat Villages grouped under the Independent Farmers' Forum (Forum Petani Merdeka: FPM, as well as an explanation of the agrarian structure of the villages. Section 5 contains a discussion of the profiles and characteristics of local and international based Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). Section 6 illustrates the role of state institutions and the Central Sulawesi Integrated Agriculture Development and Conservation Project (CSIADCP). Section 7 describes the background, political process and controversy surrounding the Dongi-Dongi case. Section

8 deals with the topic of illegal logging operations in the Lore Lindu National Park. Section 9 closes the paper with a summary of important issues pertaining to the Dongi-Dongi case.

1.2. Research Context


Dongi-Dongi is an area located inside of the Lore Lindu National Park which encompasses two villages in two districts: (1) Sedoa Village, Palolo sub-district, Donggala District; and (2) Tongoa Village, Lore Utara Sub-district, Poso District. The area of Dongi-Dongi is concentrated along the section between kilometer 66 and kilometer 79 of the Palolo – Napu provincial road (see Figure 1). Even though the majority of Dongi-Dongi is located within the Lore Utara Sub-district, Poso District, geographically it is closer to Palolo Sub-district, Donggala District.

Covering 3,500 ha of forestland, Dongi-Dongi is located 1,100 m above sea level in the upper watershed of the Sopu-Gumbasa River. The topography of the area is plain to undulating (land slope less than 20 percent). According to the Draft of the Lore Lindu National Park 25 – year Management Plan, Dongi-Dongi is categorized as a core zone.¹

On June 19, 2001, the villagers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat Villages organized in the Independent Farmers' Forum (Forum Petani Merdeka: FPM) conducted a rally at the Provincial People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) of Central Sulawesi. These four villages are located in Palolo Sub-district, Donggala District, at the border of the National Park and inhabited by the Ta'a ethnic community who were moved from the surrounding upland area to these villages in 1973, 1978 and 1979 through the resettlement project of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the local transmigration projects of the Ministry of Transmigration and Ministry of Forestry.

The FPM declared that they moved into Dongi-Dongi because the available land resources were no longer able to support their basic needs. They exerted pressure on the DPRD to fulfil the two hectare-land provision promised to each household when the projects were commenced, instead of the 0.8 ha which was actually provided to each family. Furthermore, the farmers stated that they planned to open Dongi-Dongi for dry land farming, cocoa and coffee plantation and rattan collection.²

Two months after the rally, around 63.5 ha of the Dongi-Dongi forest had been converted to dry land farming and temporary settlements, with 1,030 households engaged in this activity (Setyo and Neville, 2001). One year later, this area had been expanded progressively to approximately 3,400 ha (Kompas, August 7, 2002).



The FPM rally was supported by the Central Sulawesi Regional Executive for WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup, The Indonesia Forum for Environment) and YBHR, People's Legal Aid Foundation). A press release issued on the same date declared the formal support of FPM's demand by both NGOs.³ The involvement of these two NGOs immediately dragged other related parties into a high level intensity of discourse and political struggle.

Those involved included the villagers at Dongi-Dongi, local NGOs, the local authorities, Lore Lindu National Park Authority Office (Dakot Taman Nasional Lore Lindu: BTNLL), the DPRD of Central Sulawesi, the Ministry of Forestry, The National Executive for WALHI in Jakarta, and the international NGOs based in Central Sulawesi: The Nature Conservancy (INC) and CARE. Those parties, all initially supportive of the conservation of the Lore Lindu National Park, split in opinion over the pros and cons of the Dongi-Dongi case into two main groups. The conflict between those two groups, particularly among the NGOs in them, led to mutual threats toward one another and the potential for mass actions.

Based on the above issues, this working paper is focused on seeking answers to the following questions: What is the background of the Dongi-dongi case? What was the process carried out by all of the concerned parties in acting to resolve the Dongi-dongi problem? Who had the most powerful influence in changing the environmental condition of Dongi-dongi? Who was most advantaged and disadvantaged in the Dongi-dongi case?

To answer the above questions, political ecology, the approach developed by Bryant and Bailey (1997), and Bryant (1998), is being used as the investigative framework for this research. There are two main reasons to employ the political ecology framework as an appropriate approach to analyze and explain the Dongi-dongi case: (1) The Dongi-dongi problem is an outcome of the interaction of actors operating within a context of unequal power relations; (2) The Dongi-dongi problem is not simply a reflection of political and market failures, but rather a manifestation of broader political and economic forces.

1.3. Political Ecology Concept and Framework

In a broad sense, Hempel (1996) defined political ecology as a study of independence among political units (actors), and interrelationships between political units (actors) and their environment. According to Hempel, political ecology is fundamentally concerned with the political consequences of environmental changes – in both physical and symbolic senses. Bryant and Bailey (1997) offer a more rigorous definition of the political ecology concept: Political ecology is an inquiry into political sources, conditions, and ramifications of environmental changes. In this term the direction of inquiry is reversed and the emphasis placed on the physical environmental consequences of political decision making. Further, Bryant and Bailey are of the opinion that in order to understand how human-environment interaction links to a spread of environmental degradation, politics should be "put first" on

the hearth of political ecology research, with unequal power relations in constituting a politicized environment as a central theme.

In the Third World, political ecology examines the political dynamics of material and discursive struggle over the environment (Bryant, 1998). Therefore, to have a better understanding of the Third World's politicized environment, Bryant suggests the direct analysis of how unequal power relations are often linked to conflicts over access to, and the use of diverse natural resources. Furthermore, he suggests focusing particularly on the manner in which power relations may be reflected in conflicting perceptions, discourses and claims of knowledge about development and ecological processes. After reviewing the historical development of the Third World political ecology, further Bryant indicates that political ecology is a research field aiming generally at relating the political, economic and ecological processes, albeit through a plurality of approaches (Bryant and Bailey, 1977).

In anthropology and other related fields, the movement of political ecology has appeared as a reaction to the neglect of the political dimension of human-environment interactions as was practiced in human ecology or ecological anthropology research in the 1960s and early 1970s (Vayda and Walters, 1999; Bryant, 1998). This neglect has stemmed from the preoccupation of human ecology or ecological anthropology approaches with homeostatic or adaptive process and, related to this, from the treatment of human communities as if they were fairly homogeneous, autonomous units involved in or engaging in those processes in relation to their biotic and abiotic environment (Vayda and Walters, 1999).

Therefore, it is important to realize that the underlying assumption on political ecology is that politics and the environment are thoroughly interconnected everywhere, as Harvey notes (in Bryant, 1998):

"All ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously political-economic projects (and arguments) and vice versa. Ecological arguments are never socially neutral any more than socio-political arguments are ecologically neutral. Looking more closely at the way ecology and politics interrelate it becomes imperative if we are to get a better handle on how to approach environmental/ecological questions".

In order to gain a detailed understanding of the political process leading to the change of resource management regimes in Dongi-Dongi, we have examined how political actors achieved their interests and objectives using their specific political means and resources.

2. THE POLITICS OF NATURE CONSERVATION AND LORE LINDU NATIONAL PARK

2.1. The Politics of Nature Conservation

Since independence in 1945, conservation politics in Indonesia have been regulated by state, most notably through Law No. 41, 1999, on Forestry (replacing Law no. 5, 1967, on Principles of Forestry Management); Law No. 5, 1990, on Conservation of Natural Resources and the Ecosystem; Law No. 24, 1992, on Spatial Arrangement; Law No. 5, 1974, on Ratification of UN Conventions on Bio-diversity, and Law No. 23, 1997, on Environmental Management (replacing Law no. 4, 1982, on Principles of Environmental Management). In addition, another law was enacted in 1960 (Law No. 5) regarding Basic Regulations on Agrarian Activities, which is closely linked to the management of conservation areas. Among those laws, Law No. 5, 1990, provides comprehensive regulations related to conservation areas.

The above state policies and laws on conservation, particularly those related to national parks, contained several critical problems:

- a) State policies on conservation lead to the implication that if an area is appointed as a conservation area, either as a natural sanctuary area, or a natural preservation area, then it becomes a prohibited area, which may not be utilized by the community. These policies give rise to conflict between the local community (either customary community or migrant community) and state, because long before the state determined the conservation areas, the areas were utilized by the local community for farming, hunting, and collecting of forest products (woods, rattan, *damar*) through their own tenurial arrangements. The rights of local communities to land and other natural resources are no longer recognized by the state. According to Sangaji (2001b: 4-6), from the perspective of local community interests, the Dutch regulation on *Natuurbeschermingsordonnantie 1942 (Ordonansi Perlindungan Alam, 1941)*, which granted the community rights to access, use and control of natural resources, is more advanced than the above mentioned state policies and regulations.
- b) The issuance of state policies has brought about the implication that the management of the national parks is meant to prioritize the biological and ecological aspects over the local community concerns. This is indicated by the criteria used to determine zones in the national park as stated in State Regulation No. 68, 1998. All criteria included in the regulation and used to determine core zones, wilderness zones, and activity zones are aimed to conserve biodiversity and the ecosystem⁴. The existence of local communities who have close socio-economic and

cultural relationships with, and a long tradition of interaction with their environment is not taken into account as an important criterion for the zoning process. As we are aware, the management of national parks is mostly directed in relation to the positioning and distribution of the park zones.

The above analysis of the politics of conservation indicates that the state places and positions the local communities surrounding the parks as people ignorant of the nature conservation, even defining them as threatening the sustainability of the conservation area. This perception is also reflected in the establishment and direction of the management of the Lore Lindu National Park. First, the border of the park and its zones have been determined without considering the cultural makeup of the communities living in the margins of the forest and their interests and socio-economic dependence on the natural resources of the area. Second, the local communities are considered social groups which need to relinquish their dependence on the land in the park through the developing and strengthening of local economic activities which are not forest resource based. The following section describes the process and implication of the said perceptions.

2.2. The Process of Park Establishment and Its Implications

The present area covered by the Lore Lindu National Park resulted from the integration of two natural sanctuaries and a natural preservation area, which were formerly separated. Those two natural reserves include the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve (131,000 ha) located in Poso District and the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve (67,000 ha) located in the Donggala and Poso Districts. The nature preserve areas included The Danau Lindu Tourism/Protected Forest (31,000 ha) located in Donggala District (Helmy, 2001; The Nature Conservancy, et al, 2001a: 181 – 191).⁵

The process of altering those three conservation areas into the Lore Lindu National Park was carried out in three preparatory stages, which took more than 20 years to implement. First of all, on October 14, 1982, the Minister of Agriculture declared the establishment of the Lore Lindu National Park, including 231,000 ha of conservation area, through the issuance of the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 736/Menteri/X/1982. This declaration was issued during the Third World National Park Congress held in Bali.

Secondly, eleven years later – October 5, 1993 – the government issued the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 593/Kpts-II/1993 for altering the function of the Danau Lindu Tourism/Protected Forest (31,000 ha), the

Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve (131,000 ha), and the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve (67,000 ha) to that of a national park called the Lore Lindu National Park. This decree also states that the boundary of the Lore Lindu National Park thus established was to be a temporary boundary. The permanent boundary for the Lore Lindu National Park (229,000 ha) was to be determined after surveys for determining the structure of the border at the location of the park.

Thirdly, in 1999, the central government completed all survey activities on the structure of forest borders and the mapping of the boundaries at the Lore Lindu National Park. On June 23, 1999, the Minister of Forestry and Estate Crops issued Decree No. 464/Kpts-III/1999 determining that the preservation forest in the Donggala and Poso districts (217,991.18 ha) would function as national park land. Under this decree, the area of the National Park was 11,000 ha fewer than stated in the Decree of Minister of Forestry No. 593/Kpts-III/1993, due to the exclusion of the Lindu and Besoa enclaves.

Since government carried out the boundary measurements and border establishment in the three conservation areas, which then became a national park, various conflicts over the land and other resources have arisen between the government and local people. Sangaji (2001b: 7-9) stated that land belonging to the local peoples of Besoa, Pekurehua, Bada, Lindu, Kulawi, Gimpu, and others was determined as being part parts of the Lore Lindu National Park without their acknowledgement and agreement. In addition, the local people whose lives were very much dependent on the forest and other natural resources were no longer allowed to hunt, collect wood, rattan, bamboo, and medicinal herbs, or to cultivate coffee, which had long been their habit. This was the situation also experienced by the local people of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Rahmat, and Kadidia villages where the people entering the Dongi-dongi forested areas lived.

Furthermore, the government also resettled local communities who had lived in the depths of the forest a long time ago upon the pronouncement of the forest as conservation areas. This was experienced by the people of the Dodolo and Katu villages. In 1998, the Dodolo villagers were resettled to Toe Jaya, an area close to the park located between Wanga and Kaduwaa Villages, in Lore Utara Sub district, Poso District. Another village located in the park called Katu Village was supposed to be resettled, but the villagers refused it, and they remained living in Lore Lindu NP. In 1999, for a second time the Katu people were to be resettled outside the park by using CSIADCP's fund supported by an ADB loan (Project Coordination Unit CSIADCP, 2002). However, this effort failed due to the sturdy refusal of the

Katu people supported by the Free Land Foundation (*Yayasan Tanah Merdeka*) (Sangaji, 2000a, 2001b:8).

2.3. Zoning of the Park and the Dongi-dongi Area

2.3.1. Zoning of the Park

At the end of 2001, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), an NGO under the support of the NRM II-USAID grant, had completed a draft Management Plan for the Lore Lindu National Park. In this draft management plan, the park was designed to comprise 8 zones (The Nature Conservancy, et al. 2001b:99 - 102)⁶:

- 1) Core Zone
- 2) Wilderness Zone
- 3) Activity or Utilization Zone
- 4) Intensive Utilization Zone
- 5) Traditional Utilization Zone
- 6) Rehabilitation Zone
- 7) Social and Historical Zone
- 8) Tourist Zone

The core zone according to the basic principles of national park management is the heart of and the unique feature of the park. Therefore, according to the existing forestry regulations, activities leading to the alteration of the function of the core zone, such as destroying the unique features of the ecosystem and its natural aesthetic and physical phenomena, decreasing the area of core zone, or conducting economic activities, which are not in line with the Management Plan, are prohibited.⁷ However, the zoning process of Lore Lindu National Park, which was designed by TNC, resulted in the following problems and weaknesses.

First, the Management Plan of Lore Lindu National Park – including zoning – was initially designed to utilize the information gathered during the biological study in and around the park carried out by TNC and the Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project (CSIADCP).⁸ In fact, however, the management plan was based only on the ecological and biodiversity study carried out by TNC. This is due to the two following factors:

- 1) The ecological and biodiversity study funded by CSIADCP was delayed far behind the completion of TNC's biodiversity study. TNC started the surveys in March 2000 and finished in June 2001. Meanwhile, the CSIADCP did not issue the contract for the biodiversity study until

November 2001, a delay of about two years from the initial plan (The Nature Conservancy, 2002a: 12).

- 2) TNC, due to restricted to the trust fund of NRM II/USAID, was to have completed the management plan before December 30, 2001, which was the deadline for the extended contract between TNC and NRM II/USAID (Juliani, S., and Damayanti B., 2001: 16).

As a result, the CSIADCP surveys could not be incorporated into the draft management plan that was finished by TNC on December 28, 2002. In the ADB loan review, the way TNC carried out its own services independently was criticized (The Nature Conservancy, 2002a: 12).

Second, the draft management plan was produced mainly based on biological and ecological data and information. The draft is rich in data and information on biodiversity and ecosystem characteristics, but has a weakness in understanding the social, economic, and cultural aspects of the community, particularly the agrarian relations between the local community and the surrounding forest, land and water sources. The draft management plan provides a detailed description of the biological character of the park, including the distribution and abundance of species there. However, the social, economic and cultural aspects were not elucidated properly. Volume 1 of the draft comprises 203 pages, but only 15 of those pages elucidate the cultural aspects of the community, and the coverage of socio-economic patterns and livelihoods amounted to only one page. From this perspective, it is obvious that TNC was more interested in exploring and analyzing biological and ecological features of the park rather than the socio-economic and cultural aspects of the communities that inhabited the surrounding areas.

Third, the draft management plan was produced in a relatively short time. According to the agreement between TNC and NRM II/USAID, TNC should have completed the management plan before June 30, 2001. However, by March 1, 2001 the progress of management plan had reached only 10% (Juliani, S. and Damayanti B., 2001: 9). Therefore, TNC requested an extension from NRM II/USAID to finish the management plan (and other work) by December 2001.

When the Dongi-dongi case emerged on June 19, 2001 the management plan – including park zoning – was an ongoing process. The emergence of the Dongi-dongi case motivated TNC to accelerate the accomplishment of the management plan immediately. The sooner the management plan documents were completed, particularly in relation to defining the status of the Dongi-dongi area, the better positioned the Park Authority (and its associates) would be to respond to Dongi-dongi case.

Furthermore, if the draft management plan was able to get approval from the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, of the Ministry of Forestry, the National Park Authority would have a stronger legal basis upon which to manage and control the national park in line with the designated zoning, including that for the Dongi-dongi area. Two months after the FPM declared that it had occupied the Dongi-dongi area for the purpose of settlement, on August 29-30, 2001, TNC held its first public consultation for the management plan and zoning of Lore Lindu National Park. In this draft management plan, Dongi-dongi was categorized as a core zone due to its position for the protection of the Sopu and Gumbasa watersheds as a water supply for the downstream area of the Palolo valley (600 m above sea level) and Palu valley (0 – 200 m above sea level).

Fourth, even though the draft management plan states that the zoning of the Lore Lindu National Park was prepared through public consultation involving local NGOs, government officials, and village communities (The Nature Conservancy, et al. 2001b: 107), the zoning was criticized by various parties, including local government, environmental activists and local NGOs in Palu. They pointed out that the process of the zoning did not involve the local community residing in the margins of the forest within a transparent public consultation process.⁹ In a public consultation forum held on August 29-30, 2001 by TNC, and attended by the Regent (*Bupati*) of Donggala and other government officials, the Regent elaborated his disappointment over the absence of all community leaders that should be involved in the zoning process in the forum. This fact was stated by two environmental activists from Palu who attended the meeting without TNC's invitation, but who were curious to find out about the zoning plan for the Lore Lindu National Park as presented by TNC (Pers. Comm.). On September 12, 2001, Forum Petani Merdeka (FPM) – the farmers' union from Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat villages who occupied Dongi-dongi – issued a declaration rejecting the draft zoning for the Lore Lindu National Park, because they were not involved in the process of developing the zoning plan. They stated that the establishment of Dongi-dongi as a core zone by the TNC was simply an effort to dislodge them from Dongi-dongi.

The above four points indicate that the existing draft of the Management Plan (including zoning) was not prepared comprehensively through intensive public consultation with the stakeholders of the park, particularly the community groups living in 60 surrounding villages. It can be concluded that in addition to the government, TNC and CSIADCP played an important role in determining the access to and control of the local community over the area's natural resources through the preparation of a management

plan and the financing of related studies. Up to the preparation of this publication, the management plan for Lore Lindu National Park – including its zoning – has not been approved legally by the Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, of the Ministry of Forestry.

2.3.2. The History of the Dongi-dongi Area

The history of Dongi-dongi is very much interrelated with the shifting natural resource management policy for the Palolo and Napu valleys. Therefore, to better comprehend the Dongi-dongi case, the following paragraphs elaborate the history of forest exploitation in the two valleys, Palolo Valley in particular.

Prior to the determination of the Lore Lindu area as the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve in 1981, in 1976 the central government through Directorate General of Forestry (under the Ministry of Agriculture) provided a forest concession to PT Kebun Sari to exploit *Agathis lorantifolia*. This concession, covering 25,000 to 50,000 ha along the Palolo Sub-district road in the Donggala District and Napu, Poso District, including the Dongi-dongi area (Sondakh, 2002: 72) was effective for 20 years. During the exploitation, PT Kebun Sari used Dongi-dongi as its base camp due to its strategic position to support the activity in the Palolo and Napu areas. The supporting facilities for PT Kebun Sari, including a helicopter paddock, maintenance and workshop facilities, oil and fuel supplies, as well as a non-permanent housing complex for field operators, were located in Dongi-dongi.¹⁰ In addition, PT Kebun Sari built a road to support its forest exploitation. This road, known by the local people as "Japanese Road" was to pass through the villages at Palolo and Dongi-dongi (1980), and Napu.¹¹ Presently, this road, passing through Dongi-dongi, is vital in connecting Palolo and Napu.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the intensity of forest exploitation by PT Kebun Sari at Palolo was decreasing significantly due to a lower volume of the *Agathis* timber than had been calculated and estimated in the preliminary survey (ibid: 73). In 1981, the Lore Lindu forest, which overlapped the concession area of PT Kebun Sari whose permit was still effective despite the decrease in its exploitation activity, was designated by the government as a Wildlife Reserve. In 1993/1994 the forest concession permit of PT. Kebun Sari in Palolo was terminated, and the area was returned to the government. However, PT Kebun Sari requested a 15-year extension (ibid: 73) for its activities in the Napu area.

When Palolo was still under PT Kebun Sari, the community of nine surrounding villages, Sintuwu, Bobo, Sigimpu, Bakubakulu, Rahmat, Kadidia, Kamarora A, Kamarora B, and Tongoa, still had access to and were not

prohibited from collecting rattan and cultivating coffee, cocoa, maize, rain-fed paddy, and cassava (Syahyuti, 2002: 66; Sondakh, 2002: 73).¹² When the production forest was designated as a wildlife reserve (1981), and its status later changed to that of a national park (1993), the access and control of the community over the forest were no longer available.

According to the community – as cited by Syahyuti and Sondakh – the change in the forest's status was not followed by a change in its boundary. The borderline of the concession area of PT Kebun Sari was used as the border of Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve, which later became the Lore Lindu National Park. As a result, the community members who were still doing farming activities in the forest area were accused of being illegal loggers by the government (Sondakh, 2002: 66).

The changes in state policies and control over the forestry resources invited protests and rallies among the communities in the surrounding villages. Syahyuti (2002: 74) noted that the first protest was conducted by a villager in 1985. The era of reformation emerging in Indonesia in 1997 encouraged the populaces of the nine surrounding villages to raise the issue of the border status of the Lore Lindu National Park. In 1998, the people of the surrounding villages conducted a massive rally at the DPRD Central Sulawesi and Park Authority (Sondakh, 2002: 74).

When Dongi-dongi was still functioning as the base camp of PT Kebun Sari, even prior to the establishment of the Japanese Road, the people of the surrounding villages cultivated coffee and cocoa and collected rattan in certain areas. However, when Dongi-dongi's status was altered from that of a production forest to that of the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve, and then to that of a national park, the local community was no longer afforded their previous access to and control of the area's natural resources. Forest Rangers now restricted the community's ability to get into the areas where they used to harvest coffee and cocoa from the trees they had planted prior to the designation of the area as a wildlife reserve and later as a national park.

Before Dongi-dongi was occupied by FPM in June 19, 2001, it was recorded four times that the surrounding community utilized Dongi-dongi for farming and resettlement area: (1) in 1981, the people of Bunga Village occupied the base camp left in the wake of the construction of the Japanese Road; (2) in 1982, the people of Kamarora attempted to prepare the resettlement of Kadidia Village under the leadership of Guru Yusuf; (3) in May 1998, approximately 450 heads of households, mostly small-scale entrepreneurs from the Rahmat, Kamarora, Kadidia, Balompea and Dangaran villages cleared 50 ha in Dongi-dongi to have additional land¹³; and (4) in 1999, around 40 people cleared 50 ha of land in Dongi-dongi. All of these

efforts were aborted by the Forest Rangers, with a total of 80 people arrested but later freed, except for one person, Mr. Lili, who was held for four months at Maesa Prison, Palu, without any judicial process (Forum Petani Merdeka, et al., 2001b: 3; Sangaji: 2001b: 8), while the rest of the community members involved were sent back to their original villages.

The above descriptions indicate that the changes in state policy on the status of the forest from exploitation forest to nature preservation, conducted without comprehending the socio-agrarian situation of the surrounding villages, created long term conflicts over access to and control of forest resources, which then led to vertical conflicts between the government and the local community.

3. LORE LINDU NATIONAL PARK AUTHORITY

3.1. Actor Description

The Lore Lindu National Park Authority, established in 1997, is a Technical Implementation Unit for the management of the forest under the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation. Although the National Park Authority was established four years after the designation of the Lore Lindu National Park in 1993¹⁴, the Authority was not fully effective until August 1999, two years after its inception, when all positions of the National Park Authority were finally occupied by qualified staff¹⁵. Most recently, the number of staff at the Lore Lindu National Park Authority stood at 89, six of whom hold bachelors degrees. And, even in this era of autonomy, national parks are still considered forested areas remaining under the management of the central government (i.e. Ministry of Forestry).

3.2. Political Interests

The main task of the Park Authority is to manage the natural biological resource ecosystem within the National Park in accordance with existing laws and regulations. To perform this task, the Park Authority has the following functions on : (a) planning national park development program; (b) administration, protection, preservation of land utilization within the park and its ecosystem; (c) promotion and information; (d) area security, forest and environment conservation, natural biological resource conservation and eco-tourism development¹⁶.

In 1999, the Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority was Mr. Banjar Y. Laban, who holds progressive views on national park management. There are three important points within Laban's view of the proper management of Lore Lindu National Park¹⁷ :

- (1) The national park management should be managed under a new paradigm of local community-based management. According to Laban, the community should be positioned as a partner of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority. Laban does not want the community to be viewed as an enemy of conservation as was experienced at the Tanjung Putting National Park in Central Kalimantan, and the Kutai National Park in East Kalimantan. Further, Laban stated that the management of the Lore Lindu National Park is not the responsibility of the government only, but also of the local community. Therefore, the community should be allowed to use the Lore Lindu National Park as long as they manage its resources properly, and their economic activities are not expanded and transferred to other parties. Laban calls this community-based management an eco-populism approach (Laban, 2000a; 2001).
- (2) Conservation and natural resource management related policies and regulations should be treated critically, particularly those with centralistic and repressive features. According to Laban, Law No. 5/1990 on Conservation of Natural Resources and the Environment only indicates the obligations of the community without the inclusion of the rights of the community in utilizing the natural resources. Further Laban (2000a) stated that State Regulation No. 25/2000 on the autonomy of the central government and provincial government creates communication gaps between the government and the community, as well as reducing the local cultural diversity.
- (3) Willingness to establish collaborative management (co-management) in the Lore Lindu National Park by synergizing the power of government, local community, and NGOs. Among the important issues resulting from the process of co-management is the Community Conservation Agreement (CCA) based on local values and norms and new regulations created upon the basis of mutual agreement. The process of the establishment of the CCAs was developed and facilitated by local NGOs. Up to March, 2002, a CCA has been established in eight villages surrounding the Lore Lindu National Park, including: Toro in Kulawi Sub-district, Katu, Sedoa, Wuasa, Kaduaa, Watutau and Betue in Lore Utara Sub-district, and Doda in the Lore Tengah Sub-district. The CCA in three villages (Toro, Katu and Doda) was established as a result of facilitation by YTM, and in other five villages (Sedoa, Wuasa, Kaduaa, Watutau, and Betue) the CCAs were established as a result of facilitation by TNC. Particularly in Toro, Katu, and Doda villages, the strengthening of community norms and values on conservation which became the

basis for the CCAs had begun as early as 1998, a year before the National Park Authority was fully operational, and two years before Laban took his position as the Head of the Park Authority.

3.3. Political Resources

There are two types of political resources owned by the Park Authority: (1) legal authority from the central government to manage and protect the park; (2) authority to manage access, use, and control of the park through the development of a management plan (including park zoning).

The political resources of the Park Authority have become more extensive because the local and international NGOs having common interests with the Park Authority are helpful in the approach to the management of the Lore Lindu National Park. This common interest enables the Park Authority to accumulate four types of political resources. First, support from international NGOs (TNC for example), international agencies (USAID) and funding agencies (ADB) through CSIADCP. Second, close partnership with domestically and locally based NGOs. One important partner that directly supports the objectives of the park is the Partnership Forum for Lore Lindu National Park (*Forum Kemitraan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu: FKTNLL*), established at the end of 1999. This forum is a coalition of around 14 NGOs, including TNC's Lore Lindu Field Office and CARE International of Indonesia, mutually supporting the achievement of common goals. Third, the local community or customary community support of the Park Authority is noteworthy because of its recognition of the community agreements on conservation including the traditional land tenure system. This recognition becomes increasingly more strategic and important to local people when their common property is located both outside and inside the park boundaries. This last political resource might be the most effective political resource held by the Park Authority in involving the local community in protecting and managing the National Park. Four, other political resources helpful to the Park Authority are ideological resources and the use of scientific knowledge in public discourse, as well as access to lobbying political and administrative decision makers. Among these resources, the first political resource is the most frequently used by the Head of the Park on occasion such as public meetings, seminars or workshops (see Laban, 2000a; 2000b; 2001;2002). Annex 1 shows various types of political resources used by the Park Authority.

4. FARMERS AND THE VILLAGE OF KAMARORA A, KAMARORA B, KADIDIA AND RAHMAT

4.1. The Description of Villages and Actors

Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat are villages which have been frequently influenced by various state policies since the beginning of their establishment. At least two government policies have had an enormous influence on the establishment of the villages and the accumulation of the farmers' concerns at the four villages:

First, the national policy on Resettlement of Community Tribes (*Pemukiman Kembali Suku Terasing*). The target of this policy is isolated tribes in various upland areas who were subsisting on traditional livelihoods and shifting cultivation which threatened the sustainability of the forests. The resettlement program included provision of guidance in relation to the livelihood of the community tribes to enable them to change their resettlement forms and patterns, cultivation techniques, cultural expressions, formal education, health care, religion, and interaction with the broad community, etc. In Donggala District, this program was implemented in 1971, and called the *Pemanti Dalika* Project (Saleh, 2001: 4 – 5). One of the communities resettled by this program was the Da'a tribe. This community lived scattered in various areas on Kamalisi mountain. Their lives were very much dependent on the forest and dry land ecosystem (Ibid: 6).

The villages of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat – along with other villages in Palolo Valley – were established under the resettlement program. The majority of people reallocated to the four villages are members of the Kaili Da'a ethnic group. At Palolo Valley, the resettlement program was begun in 1974 by establishing Rahmat Village located to the southeast of Makmur Village. The people reallocated to Rahmat Village were from the Morui, Salua, Bolobia, Biromaru, Polele, Wayu, Doda, Onjosua, Beka and Dolo areas (Forum Petani Merdeka, et al., 2001a: 3).

Further, in 1979 about 500 households (2,437 people) were resettled at Kamarora Village located at the eastern edge of Rahmat Village. These households came from Morui (70 households); Salua (30); Biromaru (70); Bolobia (70); W. Rolele (60); Wayu (60); Doda (50); Onjosua (50); Beka (20), with 20 households from various places (Forum Petani Merdeka, et al., 2001a). In 1998, Kamarora Village was expanded into two villages namely Kamarora A and Kamarora B due to the huge number of its villagers (Ibid: 3).

In 1983, another resettlement move was carried out through the local transmigration program for 100 heads of households to Kadidia sub-village. At that time Kadidia was one of the sub-villages of Kamarora Village, Kadidia has since come to be classified as a village. Those reallocated to

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Kadidia came from Dolo Sub-district (52 hh), Marawola Sub-district (36 hh), and Kulawi Sub-district (12 hh) (Ibid: 3).

In Palolo valley, the village of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat, as the second group in the history of village establishment, were categorized as new villages (Syahyuti, 2002:35-37). Although the majority of people in the four villages are from the Kaili Da'a ethnic community, the populace of the area is comprised of various sub-ethnic groups coming from different places. This situation is quite different from that in "the original villages" which had experienced a long process of co-evolution with the local ecosystem, and which were composed of relatively homogenous populations, such as those found at the villages of Sigimpu, Petimbe, Kapiroe, Bunga, Bakubakulu, Bolo, Lemban Tongoa and Makmur located in the same valley.

The above condition indicates that the villagers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat – as is characteristic of frontier settlers – live within a loosely knit type of social relations. A relatively short adaptation period, redefinition of old social ties and relations in a new environment, and structural pressure are causes of an unnatural process in the co-evolution of the four villages. Therefore, the local or community livelihood systems in the four villages have not yet been fully established (cf. Syahyuti, 2002). A social system disrupted internally by massive external structural pressures leads to difficulties in establishing a new social organization in those villages.

Also, the socio-agrarian way of life of the four villages is very much determined by structural factors. As has been mentioned in the chapter on research context, the resettled communities in the four villages were promised 2 ha of land per household by the government. However, they only got 0.8-1.0 ha per household (Forum Petani Merdeka, et al., 2001a: 3). Within 20 years, the size of the land was no longer able to accommodate the people of the four villages as their population doubled to around 1,552 households or 5,251 persons. A field report prepared by People's Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Bantuan Hukum Rakyat: YBHR) points out that in 2001 about 60% of the population of the four villages had no land, and that some extended households stayed in one house (Firdaus, 2001; Forum Petani Merdeka, et al., 2001a: 4 – 5) (see Table 1).

Similar information was elucidated by the provincial government of Central Sulawesi which reported that 200 out of 600 households in Rahmat Village had no land (Central Sulawesi Governor, 2001 in Firdaus, 2001). A survey conducted in Rahmat Village by an anthropologist, Tania Lie, provides similar information: 80 out of 177 households at Sub-village 1 (Hamlet 1) had no land at all (Sangaji, 2001b: 9). Meanwhile, government institutions occupy large areas of land for their employees in Rahmat Village. For example, the

Local Internal Audit Office (*Kantor Inspektorat Daerah*), Justice Office (*Kantor Pengadilan Negeri*), Palu, and Local Development Bank (*Bank Pembangunan Daerah*), each occupy around 100 ha, while former governors/officials of Central Sulawesi Drs. H. Galib Lasahido (around 175 ha) and H. Abdul Asis Lamajido SH (approximately 30 ha) also have use of large areas of land (Walhi Sulteng, 2001: 8).

Table 1. Number and Percentage of Landless Farmers in Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat Village

Village	Total Households	Households owning Housing		Landless Farmers	
		Households	%	Households	%
Kamarora A	479	-	-	220	46
Kamarora B	313	298	95	261	83
Rahmat	600	400	67	325	54
Kadidia	160	100	62	125	78
TOTAL	1,552			931	60

Source: Firdaus (2001), Forum Petani Merdeka, et al. (2001a: 4-5)
(- : no data)

Second, the changes is government policies on the status and function of forested areas in Palolo Valley – defined as production forest under the concession of *PT Kebun Sari* before being designated as the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve, and later as the Lore Lindu National Park (see paragraph 2.3.2. The History of Dongi-dongi) – have modified the access to, utilization and control of forest resources by the community in Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat Villages. In addition to these four villages, other villages affected by the policy changes on forest status include Sintuwu, Bobo, Sigimpu, Bakubakulu, and Tongoa.

As part of the impact of these policy changes, the villagers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat Villages are no longer allowed access to the forest to collect rattan and to cultivate coffee, cocoa, maize, rain-fed paddy and cassava. Those who are still utilizing the forest area are accused of being encroachers (Syahyuti, 2002; 66; Sondakh, 2002: 73; Forum Petani Merdeka et al., 2001a: 2). Although they are allowed to harvest existing cocoa and coffee crops, they are prohibited from maintaining the plants that yield those crops. As a result, the plants slowly stop growing. The people arrested for collecting rattan have been put in prison and the collected rattan was destroyed (Forum Petani Merdeka: FPM, et al., 2001a:2).

Nevertheless, the villagers have not been discouraged from utilizing the forest area as they had done previously, including utilizing the land in the Dongi-dongi region.

When Dongi-dongi was occupied for the third time (in 1998) and the villagers were returned to their original villages, the government then promised to give them alternative land. They were offered land located in the Manggalapi area close to Sausu village in the Parigi Sub-district, Donggala District. However, the villagers complained that the area offered was too remote from Palolo Sub-district. In addition, there were no transportation facilities serving that area. Some of the villagers moved to this new place, were later found to have gone back to their original villages.

In the face of this experience and the villagers objections to the alternative land provided, the resolution of the problem of the landless farmers remained uncertain. This uncertainty prevailed until June 2001 when villagers from the four villages took matters into their own hands and occupied the Dongi-dongi.

In the period of 1998–2001, various conservation projects and development programs were implemented in the villages around Lore Lindu National Park, including Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat. The CSIADCP, TNC and CARE introduced various conservation and development projects, such as conservation training, physical construction, and clean water facilities, as well as provision of agricultural input (seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides/insecticides).

From the point of view of the program implementers, all programs and projects were aimed at improving the socio-economic situation of the community in villages in the margins of the rainforest, and at improving the awareness of the community of the importance of the ecology and the functions of the national park. This was expected to have a positive impact on the stability of the Lore Lindu National Park. On the other hand, the main problems in relation to the socio-agrarian issues encountered by the villagers along the border of the Park remained untouched by the projects and programs. Those programs tended to focus on agricultural intensification and diversity of economic sources. Therefore, it is not surprising that the programs were not sustainable due to failure in identifying the real issues.

4.2. Political Interests

There are at least three important aspects to the background of the occupation of Dongi-dongi by the villagers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia, and Rahmat Villages. First, was the issue of perceived injustice. The two ha of resettlement land promised by the government for each household

never materialized. This issue of injustice was focused on intensively by the villagers because they were no longer able to access Dongi-dongi to collect rattan and cultivate crops in order to supplement their livelihoods after the status of the area was altered to that of a conservation area. Second, physical and geographic aspects of the region also had an impact. The Dongi-dongi area has a better topography in that it is relatively flat and undulating. The position of Dongi-dongi along the provincial road of Palu and Napu provides easy access to and from the region's various growth centers (Palu, Palolo, Napu, Poso). Third, the strong possibility that Dongi-dongi would be selected for occupation by the villagers instead of their opting to occupy land formerly allocated for government officials and institutions, as a result of the recent shift in political power between the national and regional governments. The era of reformation begun in 1997 and the enactment of Law No 22/1999 on Local Authority have "weakened" the central political power over local government. Moreover, in the middle of 2001, the presidential administration of Abdurrahman Wahid was facing de-legitimization of its authority and power. This influenced the views of FPM, WALHI and YPR that the political power of the Park Authority (a subordinate of the central government) was weaker than the power of the absentee landowners, including both active and former government officials at the provincial and district levels.

The statement issued by FPM on June 19, 2001, pressured the government on the following points: (1) Provision of land at the former concession area of PT Kebun Sari (Dongi-dongi) to landless farmers; (2) Provision of the full 2 ha of land as promised by the Resettlement Project and Local Transmigration Program in 1979 and 1983; (3) The ownership of the plants cultivated in the Lore Lindu National Park by the community should be recognized and continued; (4) Disadvantageous loan supported projects must be rejected; (5) The equal distribution of land to the local people, which would be understood by the farmers to indicate the support of the interests of the concerned parties.

The first point – reflecting the interests of FPM, the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and YBHR – demanded that the government provide land in Dongi-dongi to the landless farmers of the four villages as a solution to the agrarian related problems impacting the area communities. The second point – reflecting the interest of the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and YBHR – refused the development projects supported by international loans such as the Sulawesi Agricultural Area development Project (SAADP) funded by the World Bank and the ADB supported Central Sulawesi Integrated Agricultural Development and Conservation Project

(CSIADCP) supported by the ADB. SAADP covered all villages in Central Sulawesi, except 60 villages in the Lore Lindu National Park area, which were included in the CSIADCP. The objection to the loan supported projects was an item on the main agenda of the Anti-Debt Coalition (*Koalisi Anti Utang: KAU*). KAU is a network of 150 Indonesian NGOs, including WALHI and YBHR, and international NGOs, which aim at discontinuing policies, development programs and projects supported by international loans¹⁸.

4.3. Political Resources

The occupation of Dongi-dongi in 2001 was different from the previous efforts to settle the area (in 1981 by villagers from Bunga, and 1982/1983, 1998, 1999 by the farmers living in the four villages). In the most recent occupation, the villagers were supported and facilitated by YBHR and the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI. The NGO facilitation and advocacy encouraged the landless farmers of the four villages to fight for their concerns and interests. Various intensive discussions with NGO activists had awakened their awareness about various structural and political dimensions of the land issues they had encountered. The facilitation process provided by the two NGOs encouraged the villagers to organize themselves into the Independent Farmers' Forum (*Forum Petani Merdeka: FPM*).

Unlike the local farmers' previous attempts at settling land, the most recent action of the villagers was well organized and the issues at focus were much more sophisticated. YBHR was specifically involved in providing advocacy in the field, and WALHI managed the campaign. In the community action carried out on June 19, 2001, both NGOs facilitated FPM in conducting a rally at the DPRD. The NGO's support and facilitation were an effective political resource for the FPM in the fight to establish their political interests. Press releases, campaign plans, debates in various forums and seminars, the active discourse covered in various newspaper and through electronic forums, as well as the rallies, were all political resources which the local farmers, now grouped under FPM, had not previously used in their efforts to settle in Dongi-dongi. Because of the support and facilitation by the two NGOs, the movement to occupy Dongi-dongi was immediately dispersed across provincial and district boundaries. With this support and the relatively widespread public knowledge of their struggle, the villagers occupying the Dongi-dongi area were able to empower themselves and mobilize in defence of their settlement and land in case efforts were made by the police or security forces to force them to move to other places.

5. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

5.1. Description of Actors

In the 1980s, the first environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) was initiated in Central Sulawesi under the name of Green Palu Foundation (*Yayasan Palu Hijau*). Nasir Abas, a lecturer at Tadulako University, pioneered the development of non-governmental organizations concerned with environmental protection issues. Many NGO activists in Central Sulawesi are quick to point out that the NGO movement in Central Sulawesi could not have gotten off the ground with the initiation of *Yayasan Palu Hijau*. In the early 1990s a new generation of NGO activists surfaced. Many of them were alumni or senior students at Tadulako University, who had been actively involved in various student activities and discussions through their college years. A large number of these younger activists started their careers in NGOs through the establishment of the Rosantapura Foundation (*Yayasan Rosantapura*). Later on, due to differences in political stances among its members in regards to the Lore Lindu Hydroelectric Power Station being developed by government, several of these activists left the Rosantapura Foundation and established a new NGO called Free Land Foundation (*Yayasan Tanah Merdeka*).

YTM became a prominent organization among the NGOs in Central Sulawesi, as well as throughout Indonesia, due to their advocacy efforts to stop the development of the Lore Lindu Hydroelectric Power Station. During the Lindu advocacy actions many NGO activists in Palu learned together how to organize campaigns and protests, to build up alliances and to establish collaboration and raise public awareness of their cause. The Lindu advocacy became an important lesson learned among NGO activists, which would determine the future direction of the NGO movement in Central Sulawesi. On the basis of these successful advocacy activities, many new NGOs were initiated by the college student and nature-loving activists involved in the Lindu advocacy.

During the economic crisis of the past decade, particularly in the 1996-1998 period, new NGOs were springing up all over Indonesia, including in Central Sulawesi. The emergence of these new NGOs was closely related to the poverty alleviation program initiated by the central and provincial governments, which required the involvement of local NGOs as facilitators or for field assistance of projects such as the Social Security Network Program (*Program Jaring Pengaman Sosial*), the Underdeveloped Village Program (*Inpres Desa Tertinggal*), and Farming Credit Program (*Kredit Usaha Tani*). However, different motives for the formation of these new NGOs emerged as well.

Considering organizational aspects, the NGOs in Palu are categorized into three types:

- a) Autonomous small-scale NGOs. This type of NGO is a small organization with 4 – 7 members based in Palu. These NGOs have no branches or representatives in other places. The most recent figures for this type of NGO indicate that as many as 70 of these small NGOs exist and 50% of those are involved with conservation, environmental, and customary community matters.
- b) NGOs functioning as umbrella or networking bodies for other organizations. Umbrella organization NGOs act as fundraising bodies, developing proposals along with its members, seeking appropriate donors of funds, which are then distributed to its affiliated NGOs depending on their area of expertise and need. Moreover, these umbrella organizations prepare and arrange for the implementation of campaigns, publications, and environmental advocacy activities. In Central Sulawesi, at least five umbrella organizations were established namely the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI; Lore Lindu National Park Forum (*Forum Kemitraan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu*: FKTNLL); Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers Coordinating Body (*Badan Koordinasi Kelompok Pecinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah*: BKKPA); Central Sulawesi Alliances for Customary Communities (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Sulawesi Tengah*: AMASUTA); and Consortium for Agrarian Reform (*Konsorsium Pembaharuan Agraria*:KPA). Recently, the number of NGO members under WALHI and FKTNLL reached more than 10 organizations each (see also Annex 3).
- c) NGOs serving as representatives or branches or implementation units of international NGOs. This category includes TNC, CI and CARE. Another group which could be classified under this category, but which is not an NGO, is the Natural Resource Management (NRM/USAID) Program in Central Sulawesi.¹⁹ This USAID supported program aims at facilitating good environmental governance among the various stakeholders (NGOs, government offices and entrepreneurs) involved in natural resource management. This program was commenced in 1992 with initial activities conducted in Jakarta, West Java, West Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. In Central Sulawesi, this program was introduced in 1999, and completed in August 2002.

5.2. Political Interests

Most of the political interests of NGOs in Central Sulawesi are a reflection of the school of thought or ideological movement adhered to by the individual NGO. At least four types of ideology-based NGOs have been found to be working actively in Central Sulawesi: Conservation movement NGOs, local community empowerment NGOs, livelihood support NGOs and NGOs concerned with a combination of these three issues.

- a) Nature conservation-based NGO, such as TNC, CI, BKKPA, FKTNLL, Friends of Maleo Movement (*Gerakan Sahabat Maleo*: GSM), Katopassa Indonesia Foundation (*Yayasan Katopassa Indonesia*: YAKIS) are categorized in this group focusing its activities on campaigns and education programs, as well as survey and research on ecological and conservation issues, such as wildlife protection, water resource preservation, and forest preservation. Many of the NGOs in Central Sulawesi initiate their activities on the basis of general conservation issues, only afterwards developing a specific focus or area of expertise in line with their political views, interests and the orientation of their networks.
- b) The local community empowerment and advocacy type of NGO groups organizations concerned with the rights of customary or local communities in order to empower them to control and utilize natural resources. The NGOs reasons for choosing advocacy issues as their main concern are as follows: (i) the root problem of natural resource degradation is a structural issue, not a matter of a lack of knowledge of conservation issues on the part of the community; and (ii) state policies on the allocation of the use of natural resources, which tended to be unfair to the local community, were viewed as structural problems requiring reform and change because of the negative impact of degradation of natural resources and marginalization of the socio-economic livelihood of the community. NGOs categorized under this classification are include YTM, *Awam Green*, YBHR, *Yayasan Jambata*, YPR, *LBH Bantaya*, and the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI.

During the last 10 years, several schools of thought or ideology have been developed and used by this type of NGO as the basic value structures of their movement. Among these ideologies are human rights, gender equality and socialism. The latter was developed particularly after President Soeharto resigned from office. The diffusion of those schools of thought or ideologies in Central Palu was closely related to the issues and activities of the NGO movement in Jakarta, as well as the global

NGO movement. Beside that, the emergence of new political parties and a more democratic climate for political discourse after Soeharto's reign ended resulted in an acceleration of the adoption of these schools of thought. However, in Palu, due the rapid creation of new NGOs and the high level of flux within the memberships of the NGOs, the initially chosen schools of taught or ideologies were often modified or adapted by individuals within smalls group inside a given NGO rather than being adopted intact by the entire institution itself.

Many of these advocacy NGOs, particularly the member organizations of the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI, placed themselves in opposition to the government and viewed that all private companies were exploitative capitalists, corrupt or not friendly to the conservation of nature. Therefore, most of these advocate groups are dependent on international rather than local funding for their activities.

- c) The type of NGO focusing on the strengthening of the livelihood of local communities works on improving the living standards of the community by disseminating information and/or implementing various developmental projects initiated by local or central government. Most of the funding and activities of these NGOs is supported by or closely linked to government programs or projects. Because the government frequently requested local NGOs to implement or facilitate activities related to its programs or projects -- such as the social security network program and the under-developed village program -- not surprisingly, many new NGOs of this type emerged in Central Sulawesi after 1996. It is also not surprising that many of the leaders of this type of NGO have close relationships with senior government officers as well as members of the House of Representatives.

When the Dongi-dongi case emerged, the NGOs in Central Sulawesi, which formerly had been eager and able to disseminate information to the public on sensitive issues such as conservation advocacy or conservation development, were split into two opposing groups (see Annex 3). The overall NGO movement which was initially characterized by mutual supportiveness and cooperation became fragmented with the various NGOs taking opposing stances and even launching attacks on each other. The Dongi-dongi case has heavily impacted the balance of power within civil society in Central Sulawesi.

5.3. Political Resources

A small leased house and a minimum quantity of office equipment (computers, email, telephone and fax facilities) is sufficient for running a small NGO in Palu. Many NGOs operate on a limited budget and sometimes are unable to provide monthly remuneration for their members on a continuous basis. Therefore, due to their political interests, many of the conservation and human rights NGOs in Palu rely on international funding for their activities from agencies such as USAID, NRM II-USAID, Asia Foundation, Spark-VSO, NRM II-USAID and TNC. Even though these NGOs have limited funds, they have developed good relations and network connections with journalists, as well as with the local communities they assist through facilitation or advocacy. Other political resources possessed by local NGOs are the capability to organize public campaigns and to advocate the interests of local communities.

International based NGOs have easier access to better funding resources as compared to local NGOs. The Central Sulawesi office of CARE, for example, has a staff of 10 people, large office rooms, and good hardware support, such as vehicles, motorbikes, and communication equipment. People who work in this type of NGO also get better remuneration compared to local NGO workers. For example, a local conservation specialist who worked in this type of NGO received \$750 as a monthly salary, while a database operator could get \$100 per month.

A foreign NGO with an important influence on the direction of the management of the Lore Lindu was The Nature Conservancy. TNC initiated its first activities in Indonesia in 1991 through a project in cooperation with the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation called the Sulawesi Parks and Partnership Program. In 1992, TNC started its initial assessment of the Lore Lindu National Park area by preparing a land use and socio-economic survey (LUSE) survey. Over the nine years that followed, the TNC program in Indonesia expanded in size and scope with the support of a number of grants. In December 1998, USAID Natural Resources Management (NRM) II awarded grants to TNC for "Building Conservation Capacity and Partnerships at Lore Lindu National Park". A sum of US\$1,370,987 was allocated for upgrading the management capability of the Park Authority, revising and developing 5-year and 25-year management plans for the Lore Lindu National Park, developing strategies for community involvement in park management, increasing the capabilities of local institutions, creating greater awareness of the importance of conservation, and addressing the economic plight of communities around the park (Juliani, S., and Damayanti B., 2001: 3; The Nature Conservancy, 2002a: 3-5) (see

also Annex 1). This grant covered activities from December 24, 1998, to June 30, 2001.

6. STATE INSTITUTIONS AND THE CSIADC PROJECT

6.1. Political Interest

When Dongi-Dongi occupation come to surface and accelerated protest between the pros and cons parties to conservation, the Poso unrest was still under way and in a condition of no signal to subside. Even though difference root of problems, the local government did not want Dongi-Dongi problem getting worst and "replicate" the Poso unrest. Therefore, the main interest of the local government was how to solve Dongi-Dongi problem without accelerating new political unrest and instability in Central Sulawesi. Thus, to protect the sustainability of the Dongi-Dongi as a catchments area for the downstream become a low priority if the enforcement to move the Dongi-Dongi settlers back to its original villages creates new social unrest.

The provincial government also feel that to move the settlers out from Dongi-Dongi was not an easy task since one of the environmental NGO who support FPM to enter Dongi-Dongi was also the same NGO who successfully stop the development of Lindu Hydro Electric Power Station and cancel the resettlement of Katu people (YTM). Therefore, when the Dongi-Dongi controversy among local community and NGOs reached its peak the provincial government seemed to withdraw from this situation and tend to shift the direction of conflict from vertical (provincial government vs. Dongi-Dongi settlers and its NGOs supporter) to horizontal conflict (NGOs and local community opposed to Dongi-Dongi vs. NGOs and local community support to Dongi-Dongi).

Another political interest of local government related to the Lore Lindu NP was the implementation of the Central Sulawesi Integrated Agriculture Development and Conservation Project (CSIADCP). This project was funded by loan from Asian Development Bank and aimed to enhance and protect sustainability of Lore Lindu NP by creating community conservation agreement and strengthening agriculture and non-farm economic activities in all villages surround the Park (see also Annex 1). The provincial and local government viewed this project was an important one since they have limited fund for developing all villages surround the Park (60 villages) simultaneously. Beside that, the local government now have more authority for planning, implementing and controlling the project than before due to the regional autonomy policy.

6.2. Political Resources

Annual development budget, network of government official from province to village, authority for law enforcement and the issuance of licences and permits for business activities and natural resource exploitation among others are the vital political resources possess by local government for planning, implementing and controlling regional development program. However, when on June 19, 2001 the Dongi-Dongi settlers demanded the local government to provide the land as promised apparently it was hard to accomplish immediately due to all regional development budget for FY 2001 has been legally allocated for various development program that has been planned year before. This condition has limited the capacity of local government to provide new land as good as Dongi-Dongi land in terms of its fertility and accessibility for the FPM members. Therefore, when provincial government offered Manggalapi, Uenuni and Lembantongoa as new alternative land, the Dongi-Dongi settlers reject this plan due to its far location and low fertility of land.

Perhaps one the greatest political resource particularly devoted for the development of the village and community lived along the border of the Park as well as for the conservation of the LLNP was the CSIADC Project which started at 1998 and will be ended at 2004. A sum of \$32.4 million of the Asian Development Bank loan were allocated for community development (\$10 million), Lore Lindu NP and its buffer zone (\$5,2 million), increase public service and infra-structure (\$14,9 millions), and project management (\$2,3 million) (see Annex 1 and Annex 2). However, this project raised many critics and protest from local community, NGOs and also government official (particularly Head of the Sub-District) due to the misuse of fund, failed to identify the basic needs of the local community, and low performance of project implementation particularly for community development and establishing community conservation agreement and buffer zone program. The last critic was the results of the group discussion initiated during the seminar and workshop for evaluation performance of CSIADCP on March 2002 at Kulawi Sub-district, Donggala District.

7. CONTROVERSY AND POLITICAL PROCESS

The controversy surrounding the case of the occupation of Dongi-dongi exhibits a pattern of escalation toward devolutive social developments. This social process, which began with acts of protest directed at the government by local farmers, ended anticlimactically with conflicts among the various components of the civil community itself. In order to understand how this could have happened, it is important to analyze the dynamics of the

political process occurring during the period of controversy, the interactions of the people and organizations involved, the different phases of the unfolding controversy, and the forms it took.

7.1. From Dialog to Polarization of Stances

When the occupation of Dongi-dongi first came to the attention of the public, everyone involved in the case acknowledged that the farmers faced a real problem in the acute shortage of land. In addition, everyone agreed to take a persuasive approach involving an in-depth dialog in order to find a solution to the problem. As a result, the initial approach to resolving the controversy surrounding this case involved intensive discussions and dialog among the various interested parties, which led to polarization of stances and open conflict among them.

This first phase of talks arose out of a demonstration by FPM at the Provincial People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) Building on June 19, 2001. The demonstrators were pressing the government to immediately allocate new land for agricultural use for landless farmers. In addition, the demonstrators demanded continued access to the fields they had cultivated and planted in the Lore Lindu National Park area.

Despite the confront way in which the farmers presented their concerns, all interested parties responded positively to the issues raised during the demonstration. YBHR and WALHI, for example, supported the demands of the farmers from the outset, although their initial statements of support were predominantly directed toward granting them control of the land rather than unilaterally encouraging the occupation of Dongi-dongi. In statements of position made while accompanying FPM representatives during the protest rally at the Assembly Building (June 19, 2001), both of these NGOs urged the provincial authorities to "develop a meaningful, effective policy in relation to the control of the land by city dwellers which has and will only continue to result in a land crisis for the farmers".

The NGOS gathered together under the umbrella of the FKTNLL network were also willing to understand the demands put forth by the farmers, although they would not in any way condone FPM's occupation of Dongi-dongi. During a meeting at the Yayasan Katopasa office on June 23, 2001, this network of NGOs came to agreement that the Dongi-dongi case should be approached differently than that of the situation in the adjacent area of Tongoa. They took the stance that a persuasive, communicative approach should be taken toward the farmers involved in the Dongi-dongi case because their actions had been motivated by a land crisis, whereas a repressive approach was required in response to the Tongoa case because the motive

there was illegal logging. This meeting also agreed to the formation of the Tongoa Dongi-dongi Solution Committee (*Komite Solusi Tongoa Dongi-dongi*) and the issuance of a statement that all NGOs should cooperate and assist each other in bringing an end to the problem of illegal logging and the clearing of forested areas in the National Park. In addition, the meeting agreed to urge the regional government to take proactive steps to prevent the possibility of horizontal conflicts occurring.

The government itself responded immediately to FPM's actions, although the response was far short of adequate. As a result of the demonstration, several meetings were held with FPM involving the executive and legislative levels of government in order to discuss the demands and to find a solution. On June 21, 2001, executive level government officials met with representatives of FPM in the DPRD Building. This meeting failed to produce any agreement because the Secretary to the Provincial Government requested more time to coordinate matters pertaining to the negotiations. FPM allowed a period up to the end of June, 2001 for the necessary preparations.

In follow-up, on June 24, 2001, the Secretary to the Provincial Government and his team made a field trip to the area in dispute in order to collect detailed data and to get a better picture of the situation there. Unfortunately, this party of executive level government officials stopped at Tongoa village and never went on to the Dongi-dongi area. In Tongoa, they immediately summoned the local Sub-district Head and the Village Heads of the four problem villages to present pertinent data and provide information. These actions deeply disappointed the farmers who had prepared to meet with the government officials in Dongi-dongi.

Besides this field trip, the authorities began discussing and analyzing possible solutions to the land shortage crisis affecting the four villages. On June 26, 2001, the executive level officials finished an executive solution concept on alternative land and immediately sent this to the DPRD for approval. This concept developed by the authorities refused to convert the function of the land in the Dongi-dongi area to that of agricultural and residential status as demanded by FPM. Instead, as a solution to the problem the government would provide land in the Palolo Sub-district, specifically in Manggalapi, Uenuni and Lembantongoa, which had been classified as Land for Miscellaneous Uses.

Simultaneously, The NGOs were holding a series of intense meetings to discuss the developments in the Dongi-dongi case. These meetings focused on the mass actions of the local populace and the suspicion that the continued practice of illegal logging may have been the motivation

behind the demonstrations and other actions taken by the farmers. On June 27, 2001, a meeting of NGOs attended by members of FKTNLL and WALHI was held in the Katopasa Foundation office. At this meeting, the NGOs agreed that a more comprehensive Tongoa Dongi-dongi Solution Committee should be formed including the networks and memberships of the various umbrella organizations concerned. This meeting also agreed that all of the NGOs should cooperate to facilitate the dialog between the government and the local people involved in the occupation of Dongi-dongi.

The most intensive cooperation and dialogs took place at this point among the various concerned parties. On June 28, 2001, facilitated by WALHI and FKTNLL, a discussion between representatives of the farmers and the authorities took place at the (DPRD) building. During this meeting, the members of the Assembly agreed to send representative to meet with the farmers in Dongi-dongi in order to determine the best solution. On the same date, in the evening, the meeting was reconvened in Dongi-dongi, with WALHI and FKTNLL still facilitating and coordinating the event. Attending this meeting were representatives of the farmers belonging to the FPM, members of the DPRD, the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (BTNLL), the traditional leader (*Ketua Adaf*) of the Sedoa/Pekurehua people, and several representatives of various NGOs.

It was at this meeting that the process of the polarization of stances among the various parties to the dispute began to become apparent. The farmers involved in the occupation of land demanded the land promised but not provided at the time of the initial resettlement. At the same time, the farmers also rejected the alternative land in Manggalapi, Uenuni and Lembantongoa provided in the recently conceived Government Concept of Solution. The farmers were of the opinion that the land provided was not good for farming because it was located in an area of steep slopes and hillsides where the soil was not fertile. They also complained that the location provided was not served by public transportation and was already fairly heavily populated. For those reasons, the farmers continued to insist on being allowed to settle the land in the Dongi-dongi area.

These demands were strongly rejected by the traditional leader of the Sedoa/Pekurehua people. This ethnic leader indicated that although he could understand the problems faced by the farmers and sincerely supported their demands for provision of land by the government, he was strongly opposed to the occupation of Dongi-dongi that they had undertaken because, historically, the area in dispute was a segment of the Pekurehua forest, the traditional homeland of his people.

The statements by the traditional Leader introduced a new problem, that being the claiming of the land in dispute as a "customary area" (*wilayah adat*) into the debate over the occupation of Dongi-dongi. This new issue motivated the scheduling of still another meeting, this time among the people of the traditional Sedoa/Pekurehua community in order to reach agreement on any demands they might have in relation to the dispute. This traditional community meeting was held the next day, June 29, 2001 at the *Wisata Hotel*. Again this meeting was facilitated in cooperation by WALHI and FKTNLL. During this meeting, the farmers grouped under FPM reiterated their strong refusal to be relocated and their demands to be allowed to remain in Dongi-dongi. This FPM's stubborn stance sharpened the conflict and intensified the existing tendency toward polarization, and made the traditional Sedoa/Pekurehua people begin to feel "increasingly uncomfortable". This meeting resulted in a deadlock without any decision being made; leaving the parties to the discussion even more widely divided in opinion as to whether to support or to reject the occupation of the disputed area. There was also an apparent shift in the focus of the solution seeking process from discussions between the FPM and the government to an open debate among the various elements within the local community itself.

Even as the farmers occupying Dongi-dongi hardened their refusal to be relocated, the government continued to plan and prepare for their removal from the disputed area and relocation elsewhere. On July 1, 2001 Head of the Park Authority (BTNLL), along with officials in the executive level of the provincial government deliberating the formation of an integrated team to carry out the relocation plan. The formation of the Integrated Team was based on the concept suggested by FKTNLL which had been discussed during two meeting held with them with out presence of members of the WALHI network.

Therefore, the end result of the first stages of discussion in this controversial case, was the emergence of two distinctly conflicting processes: the continued agitation on the part of the farmers demanding that they not be relocated, and the government's continued preparations to move the farmers. Clearly the polarization of stances among the parties to the dispute had reached a definitive level.

7.2. Sophistication of Discourse, Opinion and Exchanges of Insults

With this increased polarization in stances, the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi escalated into a new phase of discourse involving intensified defense of the positions taken and more sophisticated argumentation in support of the stances held by all of the concerned parties.

At this stage of the controversy, the NGOs and all of the other parties involved in the debate were forced to define the increasingly polarized positions they were taking.

In general, the stances taken on the occupation of Dongi-dongi were clearly divided into two opposing points of view. The first point of view defined the problem as an agrarian issue, which could be resolved through efforts at reformation of the existing agrarian structure. Basically this view was most clearly voiced by YBHR, WALHI and several other NGOs. The second point of view perceived the problem as a conservation matter because the situation threatened an area set aside for the conservation of a tract of land that played a very important ecological role and provided a vital hydrologic function. This was the point of view advocated by the NGOs grouped together in the FKTNLL network, as well as that of the foreign NGOs operating in Central Sulawesi. The first point of view clearly did not deny the importance of conservation, just as the second point of view did not ignore the agrarian problem. The two stances differed primarily in the emphasis placed on the main aspects of the two issues, with this emphasis then used in evaluation of other aspects of the problem.

Within the framework of the first point of view, the matter of conservation was not disregarded, it just had to be applied in a way that accommodated the needs of the people and took into consideration the specific conditions and social-agrarian structures of the communities concerned. Conservation policies could not be accepted as valid if they were implemented in ways that did not take into consideration the social structure of the original communities, and especially if these policies were to radically impact the existence of these communities.

Coincidentally with the escalation of the debate, the defining and constructing of this type of point of view became a part of the campaigns waged by the NGOs supporting the farmers' occupation of Dongi-dongi. The increasing momentum in this phase of the conflict, was perhaps apparent in the Public Debate on a National Park Moratorium which was held on July 5, 2001. This public debate took place at the *Dwi Mulya* Hotel with Arianto Sangaji, the Director of the Tanah Merdeka Foundation, suggesting a moratorium on national parks on the basis of three points. First, that land designated for use as a national park should be returned to its previous function before it was designated for conservation. Second, that once the moratorium was in effect, all exploitation of natural resources in the conservation area must be stopped, including the activities of plantation companies. Third, the ownership structure and control of the land around the Lore Lindu National Park must be redefined and changed. Only then would it

be possible to designate new conservation areas through public discussion and consultation with the concerned communities.

Arianto Sangaji is a very influential figure in NGO circles in Palu. His suggesting a moratorium on national parks in relation to the numerous problems arising in the agrarian sector in the region was very controversial. This was because this idea tended toward a pattern of confrontation that could be said to be an offer of a zero sum game.

However that may be, within the context of the first point of view described above, the setting forth of this idea was understandable. The existence of national parks, in the framework of this mindset, could be viewed as one of the causes of the imbalance in the social-agrarian structure of the villages in the area.

Following the discourse on the moratorium on national parks, the adherents of the first point of view brought up other related issues, including eco-fascism in the management of national parks. The setting forth of this issue constituted a counter-discourse directed toward the policy of eco-populism which was introduced by the Head of the Park Authority (BTNLL), Banjar Y. Laban. Although Banjar did exhibit the courage to recognize a number of customary communities, the national park concept alone, to those advocates of the first point of view, his policy was still definable as eco-fascist because it was based on the classic paradigm inherent in the conservation of nature. This pattern emphasized the establishment of protected areas, to which access would be restricted, as a solution to the destruction of tropical forests. In essence, this policy was anti-community because the human populace was viewed as a threat to and even an enemy of the national parks. Even though before the establishment of such parks, the local people had lived and interacted closely with the forests surrounding them.

With the emergence of the issue of a moratorium against national parks, and the discourse on eco-fascism, the perception of the problem expanded to include the question of the status of the national parks themselves. Both of these controversial topics became immediately popular, with the terms moratorium, eco-fascism and eco-populism used as a kind of jargon within any number of debates and the process of negotiation itself. In sometimes heated discussions on the internet – which were metaphorically dubbed "star wars" – these topics became a source of never-ending criticism and even threats exchanged between and among the various NGOs.

However, what is more important, is that the emergence of these issues also motivated the creation of a win-lose situation in which every party felt driven to fight to the finish. This was a fundamental reversal of the environment conducive to dialog, which existed at the beginning of the debate

over the Dongi-dongi controversy. In such a situation, each and every party concerned was forced to express their position vehemently; so that the structure of polarization became increasingly solid within the existing framework of thought. The establishment of firm positions was done in an explicit and blunt manner. For example, in an email sent in a mail group exchange on July 16, 2001, Arianto Sangaji pressured TNC to "face the Dongi-dongi case openly; TNC must appear openly in the public" and "take a clear stance openly on the matter of Dongi-dongi".

Compared to the adherents of the first point of view, the NGOs which leaned toward emphasis on conservation were left far behind in the production of issues and opinions. They supported the more normative view of the problem which clearly emphasized the ecological function of the Dongi-dongi area. According to them, the location of Dongi-dongi toward the top of the upper reaches of a valley, made it a vital water catchments area.

Based on this normative viewpoint, they voiced a number of hand-me-down (copy-cat) issues, in particular the clearing of protected forests and illegal logging. This group of NGOs said that it would be impossible within the framework of massive forest clearing such as was taking place in Dongi-dongi for illegal logging to not occur. They also expressed doubts that the farmers occupying Dongi-dongi were only cutting the smaller trees to erect plantation huts (*sabua*). In fact, based on what they had seen in the field, they suspected that there was a syndicate of financial backers who supported and exploited the occupation of the forested areas in order to gain access to the timber there. They viewed the support of several NGOs of the occupation of the land by farmers as little more than smoothing the way for the financial backers' exploitation of the Lore Lindu National Park.

Besides the topic of conservation, the NGOs the NGO circles rejecting the occupation of Dongi-dongi also voiced the issue of the sovereignty of traditional lands. According to these NGOs, FPM's claim to the Dongi-dongi area was entirely without basis. This was because this area was the sovereign region of other Customary Communities, those being the Sedoa/Pekurehua people. Although the 4 villages where the farmers who were members of the FPM originated from were disadvantaged by the unilateral designation of National Park borders, this type of "flawed process" should not be used to validate the occupation of Dongi-Dongi because there was no solid connection between the four FPM villages and Dongi-dongi. This was especially true in relation to discussions about reclaiming the land because the original owners had more right to it than the members of FPM which had been formed as recently as the middle of 2001. Therefore, there was no good reason for FPM to have occupied the land at all. In fact, the

farmers' actions were an infraction against the sovereign rights of customary communities.

However that may be, the advocacy of this last issue was truly risky because it involved two local communities with the real potential for a horizontal conflict developing between them. It was this concern that led to limited exploitation of this issue. As well, it was understood that this issue could not be developed adequately nor could it be widely used to influence opinion by this circle of NGOs, as was the case with the issue of conservation they had brought up previously.

Because of this, the conservation NGOs were extremely defensive in the face of the discourse and opinions being put forth by the first group of NGOs. Failing to find and to creatively develop issues and tools for leverage in the debate, the conservation NGOs became trapped in reactive responses to the discourse set forth by the other parties to the dispute. These reactive responses often came to take the form of insults. For example, in an email message dated July 12, 2001, Shadiq of FKTNLL accused YBHR of having connections with the People's Democratic Party (*Partai Rakyat Demokrat*). He retracted this email statement the next day after receiving several protests and reprimands from a number of sources. Another example is an email sent on July 20, 2001 from among the same circle accusing WALHI of betraying the environment and bringing up issues surrounding the National Park Moratorium.

Among the more important phenomena relating to this discourse warfare on the Internet was the emergence of anonymous emails. The senders of these emails never revealed their true identities even though their messages were labeled "anonymous letters" whose contents could not be validated within the discourse. In relation to the ongoing discourse and debate, these email messages voiced opposition to the occupation of Dongi-dongi, often using harsh wording. These accusations and insulting statements sent through the anonymous emails were fishing for responses of a similar ilk from the targeted NGOs. As a result, for almost three months, from June through August 2001, the correspondence occurring in a number of mail groups in Indonesia was colored by this email war among the NGOs in Central Sulawesi.

This development within the community of environmental NGOs turned out to have a profound effect on the farmers involved in the occupation of Dongi-dongi. The win-lose situation which was developing forced the FPM to take a more cohesive, harder stance on the solution offered by the government. So, when the Donggala Regent and Regency Assembly members visited Dongi-dongi, the farmers firmly rejected the government's

offer of alternative land and insisted on staying in Dongi-dongi. The farmers took the same firm stand during a hearing with the DPRD on July 9, 2001. During this meeting, FPM went so far as to state its rejection of the presence of TNC in Palolo; this being a reflection of the exchange of insults among the NGOs on internet forums.

7.3. Leadership of the Masses and Claims of Customary Communities

As the dispute became increasingly more heated, the concerned parties were forced to make efforts to mobilize the public in order to strengthen their own positions. These efforts took the form of exploiting the claims of Customary Communities, the creation of alliances among various organizations, a war of words through issuance of statements, as well as the creation of oppositional organizations.

The first mass action to take place after the occupation of Dongi-dongi was carried out by FPM itself and a number of the NGOs that supported the farmers' stance which were gathered under the umbrella of the Katuvua Alliance. On July 19, 2001, this alliance consisted of FPM, YBHR, WALHI, YTM, LMND, YPR, SNTF, STN, FNBI, and AMASUTA, held a demonstration in front of the Governor's office. They set forth two demands during this protest: (1) the release of Dongi-dongi and (2) the distribution of the "absentee land" to the people living in the area.

During negotiations with the government which was represented by the Deputy Governor and the Provincial Secretary, FPM reiterated their firm stance that they refused to leave Dongi-dongi. In addition, FPM asked that the government recognize their existence as an organization and be willing to assist them in managing their settlement of the Dongi-dongi area. FPM also expressed the willingness to make a formal agreement with the government, even one based on traditional (*adat*) law, on conservation of the National Forest. In response, the government continued to take the stance that the farmers should wait for the results of the working panel/team. FPM refused to wait for the report because even after a period of 10 days, the panel had yet to take any actions because they claimed they were waiting for the completion of Duty Letters and other bureaucratic matters. At the same time, the farmers and the larger community were becoming impatient with the process and with being told to wait a little longer. This meeting ended with a deadlock without any decision being made at all.

After the negotiations fell through, the people gathered for meeting did not disband immediately, instead they continued to demonstrate and held a protest rally at the Tadulako University Campus. During this rally, FPM reiterated the farmers' intention to settle in Dongi-dongi and their refusal to

negotiate any further with the authorities. FPM also emphasized its commitment to clear only enough land for the 1,030 heads of households.²⁰ This number encompassed the heads of households from the first generation of transmigrants who received less land than promised at the time of the resettlement project, other heads of households within that community and the heads of households whose land was washed away in floods. During the rally, the farmers also announced that they planned to hold a traditional land clearing ceremony on Monday, July 23, 2001 and invited everyone to come to that event.

This unilateral action by the FPM brought an end to the previous efforts at dialog. At that very moment, the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi became a "ball of fire" spreading sparks of conflict among the local community. Meanwhile, the government, the most competent party within efforts to resolve the conflict, simply disappeared from the unfolding process and took no initiative in seeking a breakthrough by finding a better solution to the problem. This "lack of presence" on the part of the state in the midst of a heated community conflict should be noted as a factor smoothing the way for the escalation of the conflict among the public.

The action taken by the Katuvua Alliance immediately drew both pro and con reactions from a number of sources. On the same day, July 19, 2001, the Kamalisi Traditional Community Alliance (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kamalisi: AMAK*) issued a statement supporting the actions of FPM and its alliance. AMAK also urged the government to take redistribute the land existing under the "absentee" status. Besides this, AMAK also rejected the foreign debt that only sold out the rights of the people and led to the exploitation of the conservation areas.

Speaking out against the statement made by this traditional community alliance, the Pekurehua Traditional Community Congress held on July 20, 2001 condemned the occupation of Dongi-dongi. The Congress, which took place in Wuasa Village, in Lore Utara Sub-district, issued the statement that: "Based on existing laws and the history of the region, Dongi-dongi and its surrounding areas fell under the jurisdiction of the Traditional Law of the Pekurehua in effect in Lore Utara Sub-district, Poso Regency." Based on this, the Congress urged the government to "Remove all settlements and residences from Dongi-dongi" and "Find and provide alternative land for settlement outside of the boundaries of the National Forest for those people who have been clearing land in the protected area of Dongi-dongi." In connection with this, the Congress also "strongly rejects the efforts of the parties who are facilitating and supporting the people who have been settling in Dongi-dongi and its surroundings."

Following this community congress, email under the name of The Tolembunga Alliance showed up on the Internet forums. This was another form of the anonymous email because the sender refused to reveal his or her true identity openly. In an email message dated July 20, 2001, the Tolembunga Alliance stated support of the results of the Pekurehua Traditional Community Congress within the efforts to retain Dongi-dongi as a part of the traditional region. In line with the decision of the Congress, The Tolembunga Alliance also rejected FPM's actions aimed at reclaiming the land. The reason for this stance was that there was no historical reason for the Rahmat, Kadidia or even the Kamarora (both A and B) peoples to have any right to the land there. The Tolembunga Alliance acknowledged only the Pekurehua traditional community as having any right to Dongi-dongi. The Tolembunga Alliance, therefore, viewed the efforts to occupy and settle the land in Dongi-dongi as "expansion across traditional regional borders" and could be interpreted as "an effort to disrupt the sovereignty of a traditional community through a systematic process".

In the wake of the Pekurehua Traditional Community Congress, the rhetoric of tradition continued to echo throughout the entire process of trying to resolve the controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi. On July 23, 2001, as promised, the citizens of the 4 villages who were members of FPM and involved in the occupation of the land in Dongi-dongi held a traditional land clearing ceremony called *To Po Da'a*. Around 1,000 people from the 4 villages attended the festivities, which involved the putting up of 14 tents and the slaughter of 4 cattle. Through this ritual, the farmers stated their ties to the land in what they called "the Village of Hope" (Ngata Katuvua). With this statement of commitment to the land, the farmers were determined to fight to the death to hold onto the land in Dongi-dongi. "Because, as one local said, "it is like we have buried our heads here."

More support for the FPM occupation of Dongi-dongi then emerged, this time with a statement from a group called the Central Sulawesi People's Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Kerakyatan Sulawesi Tengah*). In a statement issued on July 24, 2001, this group took the following political stances: (1) Dongi-dongi land is for the people; (2) All anti-democratic and repressive laws, government regulations, rulings and decision letters must be rescinded; (3) the Central Sulawesi government must be pressured to void all permits for business in the national park area; (4) Support must be given to the Palolo farmers grouped under the Independent Farmers Movement (*Gerakan Petani Merdeka* [sic]) to confiscate the land held by government officials in Palolo, particularly in Dongi-dongi; (5) eliminate the militarism of

the New Order, and (6) Create an economic structure based on the strength of the people and not dependent on foreign economic models.

At the same time, disagreement with the occupation of Dongi-dongi was heard from a group called Poor Farmers Solidarity Forum (*Forum Solidaritas Petani Miskin*: (FSPM). FSPM was affiliated with the Katopasa Foundation and YBH Bantaya Office that were based in Berdikari Village. In a statement dated July 25, 2001, this forum openly urged opposition to the occupation of Dongi-dongi because of the suspicion that a local lumbering syndicate was exploiting the farmers' movement in relation to the occupation. This forum also stated that there were three groups of people involved with the occupation, all with distinct motives and purposes. According to the FSPM Forum, the first was indeed a group of farmers with no land to till in their own villages; the second was a group of financial backers who had come to that region mostly due to their interests in the logging industry, and the third was a group of financial backers who were interested in expanding the amount of property under their control.

Coming at the problem from a different point of view, in response to concerns expressed by a number of parties about the potential for ecological degradation of the land in the wake of FPM's occupation of Dongi-dongi, on July 26, 2001, a farmers' forum announced its intention to issue what was called "The Dongi-dongi Unified Charter for the Management of Natural Resources" (*Piagam Kesepakatan Dongi-dongi untuk Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam*). This Charter, which was the result of meetings among traditional leaders and public figures who came to an agreement through discussion toward consensus, constituted a number of regulations on the management of the region and even set out traditional sanctions. Among the matters dealt with under these regulations were the distribution of land and its allocation, the management of water, rivers and forests, as well as the settlement of land and the administration of settlements. Under this Charter, it was also agreed that the land should not be sold, nor should trees any larger than 30 centimeters in circumference be cut down; that nothing should be cultivated along river banks, that rice fields should not be developed in the area, and that only annual crops such as coffee, pepper and candlenut.²¹

After the announcement of the Charter, on the same date, July 26, 2001, Sidiq of YBHR sent an email encouraging all parties to support the desires of the FPM farmers settling in Dongi-dongi. His reasoning was that since the traditional ceremony held on July 23, 2001, no efforts to move the settlers would be effective and could even give rise to new problems. The only feasible focus at this time should be "how to guarantee that their management of the area in question did not deviate from the principles of

conservation." YBHR itself, according to the email, intervened with FPM concerning the layout for the usage of the land in Dongi-dongi; a fact verifiable in the issuance of the conservation charter which had been agreed to by all members of the FPM. YBHR then encouraged all parties to focus their attention on the implementation of the conservation charter.

YBHR's suggestions got a pessimistic response from the Tolelembunga Alliance. In an email dated July 26, 2001, the Alliance stated its doubts about the use of any such charter on conservation, especially if viewed in the context of the principles of conservation. Because, according to the contents of the email, "if more or less 2,000 hectares of arable land in Dongi-dongi are settled by around 1,000 people [sic], there would not be enough land area left for any kind of social infrastructure, not to mention the further division of the land as families grow and children create their own families – where will there be any more space for the forest: Where is the logic of conservation in any of this?"

The Tolelembunga Alliance asked YBHR to consider the possibility of horizontal conflict among the various communities that could occur if FPM continued to insist on having its demands met. This alliance also criticized YBHR's idea of an alternative "community compromise" to overcome the potential for conflict. In any discussion of compromise, the Tolelembunga Alliance was of the opinion that there should have been a three-level (government level, conservation institution level (involving both formal and informal organizations), and especially the Pekurehua community level) approach to seeking a compromise within the context of the occupation of Dongi-dongi. The alliance viewed the actions taken by FPM from the very beginning of the controversy to be extremely partisan and to have ignored the interests of the other three parties concerned.

Once the controversy surrounding the case of the Dongi-dongi occupation sharpened to the point that the NGOs themselves began to play a more major role in the direction the situation was taking, any effort toward a "community compromise" was almost impossible. Instead of compromise, what happened was the continuous development of tension among the members of the community and among the NGOs themselves. This increasingly tense situation, whether they wanted to or not, forced the NGOs involved in the controversy to take steps to try to calm things down. On July 28, 2001, a meeting of NGOs was held in Palu, which resulted in agreement on the three following points. First, no further assistance would be given in the Lore Lindu National Park area, with full sovereignty returned into the hands of the local people (a moratorium on assistance). Second, the people would be given time to discuss the Dongi-dongi case among themselves. Third, the

NGO activists would no longer discuss the Dongi-dongi controversy on the Internet, pending a decision by the people.

The agreement to take a break from assistance in the Dongi-dongi area turned out to be able to reduce the tension for the time being, although it had no impact on the resolution of the conflict itself. According to Nasir Abas, a senior NGO activist in Palu, it was during this break in assistance that the incidence of illegal logging in the Dongi-dongi area increased immensely.²² However that may be, for the parties to the conflict themselves, this period of time could be used effectively to consolidate their own individual strengths in preparation for the next phase of the conflict. In this way a new forum was formed for even greater conflict and controversy.

7.4. Efforts to Repress and to Defeat Opponents

The controversy over the occupation of Dongi-dongi eventually reached a level of culmination. This phase was marked by repressive moves on the part of the government and efforts among the various groups within the civil community to negate the existence of others with opposing views. These developments were sparked by the steps taken by the government toward a repressive approach to the situation after the dialog and persuasive means previously utilized in attempts to resolve the problems failed to bring about positive results. The situation was further exacerbated by the government's efforts to gain public support for its repressive actions.

Facing a situation in which all attempts at dialog were defeated by the hard stance taken by the farmers grouped in FPM who did not want to vacate the land they had occupied in Dongi-dongi, the government began to feel it had no other option in resolving the problem but to enforce the law strictly and forcefully. Therefore, on August 8, 2001, the provincial Governor sent a letter to the Central Sulawesi Head of Police instructing him to take firm action in Dongi-dongi because Dongi-dongi was a regional asset and conservation area that had to be guarded and protected.

After the Governor's letter was received, the Regent of Donggala followed up by issuing an instruction letter to the Palolo Sub-district head, the Village Heads in the Palolo Sub-district, and the Palolo Sub-district Traditional Council. In this letter dated August 16, 2001, the Regent of Donggala instructed the above mentioned parties to: (1) Summon the area residents who had occupied Dongi-dongi (2) Clear all squatters out of Dongi-dongi and put an end to the clearing of land there (3) Enforce the status of Dongi-dongi as a water catchment zone, and (4) Carry out all of the above orders (Points 1 through 3 with no exception) within a period of no more than 3 days (3 x 24 hours) beginning from August 20, 2001.

In response to this threat of repressive action, on August 19, 2001, WALHI issued a statement demanding that the Regional Police restrain from imposing a security approach to the situation. In its response to FPM's efforts to settle the land in Dongi-dongi, WALHI asked that the authorities "not view the actions as a criminal case because the land they are occupying is designated as a National Park". Instead, "this case should be viewed as an agrarian conflict, in which an imbalance of land ownership has occurred in the area surrounding the National Park".

This rejection of a repressive security approach was also voiced by YPR, STN, SNTP and AMAK, all of which were affiliated under the Alliance Opposing Violence Against and Oppression of the People. In a statement issued on August 22, 2001, this alliance strongly condemned all forms of violence and intimidation toward the people. In addition, the Alliance urged the FPM to not back down in the face of the threat of repression.

While the regional authorities were preparing to take repressive action, it should be noted that the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (BTNLL) and members of the public were making efforts on the basis of existing laws to submit a formal complaint to the police against the people involved in occupying Dongi-dongi. These legal actions were not just directed at the farmers occupying the land, but were more focused on the NGOs which were viewed as having stirred up the farmers and encouraged their occupation of Dongi-dongi. On August 13, 2001, for example, the Head of the National Park Authority sent a letter to the Central Sulawesi Regional Police concerning the case of national park land located in Dongi-dongi. In the fifth point set out in that letter, the National Park Authority requested that the Regional Police "investigate YBHR, in relation to enforcing the law in line with all existing regulations and rulings".

In response to the legal process initiated by the National Park Authority and the steps toward forceful action being taken by the Government, the NGOs supporting the occupation of Dongi-dongi took counter actions. The NGOs perceived the recent steps taken by the National Park Authority as revealing of the true militaristic and eco-fascist face of that agency. This perception led the NGOs to strongly challenge the radical obsession of the Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority (BTNLL), Banjar Yulianto Laban, in order to change the conservation regulations to become more ecopopulist and supportive of the "little people" (*wong cilik*). As part of their response to the latest moves by the Bureau Head, Arianto Sangaji, on behalf of the NGOs, suggested that the National Executive for WALHI withdraw the "WALHI Award" it had bestowed upon Banjar Y. Laban.

However, it turned out that the demands to continue the legal process did not originate solely from the Government. Similar demands were being made by a number of segments of the local community, such as Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili Council (*Dewan Adat Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili*). During a traditional ceremony attended by the Governor of Central Sulawesi on August 18, 2001, the Council demanded that the Governor immediately take steps through the legal system to stop the land clearing in Dongi-dongi. The Council also asked that the government provide alternative land for the people who were settling in Dongi-dongi as soon as possible.

On August 23, 2001, a meeting was held among the Regent of Donggala, the Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Bureau, important figures from the Kulawi and Da'a Customary Communities, the Uenuni Village Head, Gafar of the Bantaya YBHR office and Alimuddin of the Katopasa Foundation at the residence of the Donggala Regent. This meeting also discussed steps toward resolving the Dongi-dongi conflict through legal channels. At this meeting it was decided that a comprehensive legal approach would be required to resolve the Dongi-dongi problem. In connection with this, the Bantaya YBHR office was asked to work with and assist the squatters who had left the Dongi-dongi settlement and returned to their home villages. This assistance was expected to result in legal product in the form of a formal request that the Regional Police investigate the people facilitating the clearing of the land in Dongi-dongi, with the expectation that this would provide a basis for action against those facilitators to make them pay moral and material damages.

As a result of the assistance provided by the YBH Bantaya office, on August 30, 2001, the people of Sintuwu Village sent a letter of complaint about the actions of WALHI and YBHR to the Regional Police. In this letter, the villagers stated: "We cleared land in the Dongi-dongi forest because we had no arable land to till, and we got information from the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI and YBHR in Palu that the Government had given permission to the public to settle and grow plantation crops in Dongi-dongi."

A similar legal process took place the next day, August 31, 2001, when the people of Rahmat Village sent a letter of complaint to the Regional Police. In this letter, the villagers set out three complaints against YBHR. The first was a demand for financial retribution for the losses incurred by the local populace in relation to the efforts to clear the forest. Second, the villagers wanted the name of their village cleared of any impression of wrongdoing because there were so many people from outside of Dongi-dongi who were claiming to be residents of Rahmat Village. The third demand related to damage to the reputation of the Da'a tribe because of the negative public

image within the community that it was the Da'a tribe that was responsible for the clearing of land in the National Park.

Still another segment of society becoming involved in the legal process was the Pekurehua Traditional Community. On the same day, August 31, 2001, in a Workshop on Environmental Investigation and Writing at Palu, this group re-emphasized the need for immediate action: "(We) urge the Central Sulawesi Provincial Government, the authorities of Donggala Regency, and the officials of Poso Sub-district to immediately take firm steps to put an end to all activity in the Lore Lindu National, in particular in the Dongi-dongi area occupied and settled by the residents of the 4 villages in Palolo Sub-district".

The efforts to take action against the NGOs supporting the occupation of Dongi-dongi increased. Interestingly, these efforts were being made not only by the authorities and the Customary Communities and villagers, action was also being taken by environmental activists, nature lovers and even by other NGOs. In the last two cases mentioned above, the pressure was being brought to bear through demonstrations and demands that the organizations deemed at fault be disbanded.

On August 30, 2001, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers (*Komunitas Pecinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah*: KPA-ST) held a protest rally at the local Assembly (DPRD) Building. During this demonstration, this group charged that the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI (YBHR and several NGOs) "are environmental criminals responsible for damage to the forest in Dongi-dongi," and also "responsible for the emergence of disharmony and tension within the regional community, in particular the trouble between the people in Lembah Napu and the squatters." The Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI was considered to have "disempowered the people, even bringing them to the brink of destruction justifying environmental anarchy". The Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers also charged that: "community was misled by the elimination of dialog and discussion from each and every effort made to resolve the conflict caused by the Dongi-dongi case." The protestors also stated their assumption that the support that the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI gave to the occupation of Dongi-dongi could be "construed as smoothing the way for financial backers with timber and real estate interests to exploit the Lore Lindu National Park".

Upon consideration of all of the above mentioned circumstances, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers came to the conclusion that "The presence of the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI had turned out to not be supportive of the ideal pattern of management for conserving natural resources, but rather that the presence of WALHI in Central Sulawesi had

resulted in a process of destruction of natural resources, the smoothing of the way for illegal logging in Lore Lindu National Park, instigating the insulting of the sovereignty of the local communities, and creating social unrest". Based on these charges, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers (KPA-ST) demanded the disbanding of WALHI in Central Sulawesi, as well as the prosecution of the organization. Also in relation to the Dongi-dongi case, the Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers rejected the use of violence or force within the resolution of the conflict.

On September 7, 2001, after dissemination of information to the public on the draft zoning plan undertaken by TNC, The People's Education Foundation (*Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat*: YPR) issued a letter addressed to the Governor of Central Sulawesi. In response to the draft zoning plan, the YPR stated in the letter that: "Dongi-dongi ..., in an arbitrary and unilateral manner had been turned into a nucleus regional zone by the Lore Lindu National Park Authority and the TNC.... The people living in the area around the National Park were in no way whatsoever involved in the process of developing the zoning plan for the region." The YPR stated the suspicion that the reason behind the development of this zoning plan was to "remove the local populace entirely from Dongi-dongi." Based on this assumption, YPR stated: "(We) firmly reject the zoning plan developed by TNC and Lore Lindu National Park Authority... and we urge all parties to reject this zoning".

Even though the zoning plan had not yet been implemented, being still in draft form and in the process of being revealed through "socialization" of its contents, the YPR Foundation's charges did not take long to spark a strong attack on TNC as the institution most responsible for the creation of the zoning plan. On September 12, 2001, around 300 farmers, members of FPM, closed down and sealed the doors of the TNC and CARE offices. They took this action because they believed that these two foreign NGOs had frequently made mistakes and detrimentally misled the public. During this action, the farmers also stated their rejection of the Lore Lindu National Park zoning plan developed by TNC because the draft had been made in a secretive and non-transparent manner without involving them.

A week after FPM's action at the NGO offices, the demands to disband the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and YBHR were once again set forth during a mass demonstration. During this protest at the Central Sulawesi Provincial People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) on September 19, 2001, organized by the Kabeloata Singgani Alliance (*Persekutuan Kabeloata Singgani*), which was made up of residents of Rahmat and Sintuwu villages, KPA-ST, FSPM, and the Urban Farmers Community (*Komunitas Petani Kota*: Kompak) six demands were made: (1)

The Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI and YBHR must jointly compensate the community for losses; (2) Alternative land must be found and prepared immediately for the landless farmers; (3) No violence or force should be used in the resolution of the Dongi-dongi case; (4) Eliminate the parties to the destruction of the environment (environmental criminals); (5) Disband the Central Sulawesi branch of WALHI and YBHR, and (6) Return the Dongi-dongi area to its original function.

In preparation for defending themselves against the demands for disbandment, the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI and its network began to mobilize supportive members of the community to campaign on a more strategic issue. The focus of this campaign was the rights of the farmers and local traditional peoples who had been repeatedly displaced over the period of 30 years of rule by the New Order government. Besides this militaristic regime, international financial forces, including foreign aid loans, had played a role in the process of marginalization of the local people.

Using the momentum of the commemoration of the nation's 40th Agrarian Day, on September 24, 2001 "Farmer's Day Action" was held and participated in by thousands of people. This event was the largest action taken in the history of protest demonstrations in Central Sulawesi. A number of NGOs, community and university student organizations, including AMASUTA, WALHI, SPRA, STN, YPR, YEI, LBH-R, YBHR, YPM, YMPP, YTM, SNTN, AMAK, SORAK and LMND. In the statement about the action taken, the protestors demanded that an end be put to the human rights abuse and expropriation of land the farmers and local Customary Communities had experienced under the New Order regime. The demonstrators also urged democratization of the management of natural resources and the renewal of agrarian practices in as short as possible period of time. In relation to the management of the Lore Lindu National Forest, the protestors strongly urged the government to revamp the regulations and rulings on the national park in order to more fully involve the local communities in the decision making processes involved in the management of the land there. In addition, the demonstrators rejected the policy of accepting foreign loans.

On September 27, 2001, another traditional meeting of the Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili community was held at the Pitu Nggota Ngata Kaili Traditional Council. This meeting once again resulted in demands that the Regional Police immediately resolve the Dongi-dongi case through the appropriate legal channels. The Council also urged the Regional Police to investigate the instigators of the occupation of Dongi-dongi. However, despite pressure from various sources, including the government itself, to process this case further on the basis of existing laws, the strong resistance of the local

people and the uncondusive security situation in Poso made the Regional Police very reluctant to take a firm law enforcement stance in Dongi-dongi. Instead, the Regional Police preferred to place this problem back in the hands of the body responsible for the management of the area, that being the Central Sulawesi Forest Service, in order that the Forestry officials could investigate to determine who among the local community were actually farmers and who the illegal loggers were.

Meanwhile, feeling pushed into a corner in relation to the Dongi-dongi case, the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI was finally lured into taking similar action. The difference was that the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI did not target the NGOs in Central Sulawesi that were directly involved in trying to force its disbandment, but rather the foreign NGO, TNC. This action took the form of sending a letter to the Director General for Forest Protection and Nature Preservation at the Indonesian Department of Forestry in Jakarta. In this letter dated September 25, 2001, the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI demanded the rescinding of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between TNC and the Directorate General for Forest Protection and Nature Preservation on the basis of the three points cited here. First, the income generating projects carried out by TNC did not provide any economic benefit to the local communities. The approach taken in these projects was not sustainable and did not touch on the basic problems faced by the people living near the Lore Lindu National Park. Second, from the very beginning, TNC had opposed community based conservation management. The activities of TNC were entirely based on the assumption that the local people were the ones damaging and plundering the conservation area. Because of this attitude, the people of the local communities always under surveillance and severe actions were taken against them. Third, in its process of preparing a management plan for the Lore Lindu National Park, TNC made a fatal mistake in issuing the draft zoning plan without involving the local communities in the areas surrounding Lore Lindu National park in the production of that document. As a result, the draft zoning map developed was very detrimental to the local people because the areas that they had traditionally controlled were classified as "utilization zones" by the draft plan. Once the Director General for Forest Protection and Nature Preservation had received the letter from the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI, the conflict among the NGOs had been taken to the national level. This action forced negotiations between the TNC Program in Indonesia based in Jakarta and the National Executive for WALHI. Within these negotiations, it was agreed to assign a mediation team made up of representatives of both organizations to Palu in order to attempt to bridge the gap in communication

and to calm any conflicts among the NGOs. In addition, while the negotiations continued, the NGOs agreed to adhere to a respite or cooling off period of two weeks to begin on October 1, 2001.

This respite phase marked the end of the open conflict among the various NGOs in Palu. It also marked the end to the demonstrations mobilized by the NGOs. This development, along with the reluctance of the Regional Police to take any risks, placed the Dongi-dongi area under the *de facto* control of the local community, and this has been the situation there since.

In the most recent developments, several FPM representatives decided to travel to Jakarta to meet directly with the Director General for Forest Protection and Nature Preservation. During this meeting held in May of 2002, the farmers asked the Director General to recognize their settlement in Dongi-dongi. On July 23, 2002, the residents of Dongi-dongi celebrated the first anniversary of their settlement in that area.

8. ILLEGAL LOGGING

Before the Dongi-Dongi area was occupied, illegal logging was widespread in the Lore Lindu National Park. Monitoring of the illegal logging activities by the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI in Lore Lindu National Park found that from January through December 2000, there were approximately 119 cases of theft of wood and rattan (WALHI, 2001: 2). WALHI identified 3 specific perpetrators (actors) involved in the illegal logging, these were: private enterprises; members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Police and Forest Rangers. Furthermore, WALHI has reported indications that in 2001, officials of the Central Sulawesi Forestry Department have also become involved in financing illegal logging activities (Ibid, 2001: 2).

From June 27 through December 31, 2001, the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, along with Police officers observed and investigated illegal logging in the Lore Lindu National Park area. As a result, as much as 302.1 m³ of wood and 55 trucks carrying wood were confiscated.²³ The highest incidence of illegal logging within that period took place in the timeframe between June 27 and July 16, 2001, with 92 m³ of wood and 20 trucks confiscated. In that period of three weeks, the amount of wood and number of trucks confiscated reached approximately 30% of the total amount confiscated in the entire six months of surveillance. There appeared to be a close connection between the commencement of the clearing of the Dongi-Dongi area by farmers from the four villages on June 19, 2001 and the intensity of illegal logging.

Two NGOs in Palu, the Katopasa Foundation and the Jambata Foundation, also pointed out proof of the occurrence of illegal logging di

Dongi-Dongi. Both NGOs reported in press releases that between 60–100 chainsaws with a capacity for cutting 1–3 m³ of wood per day per chainsaw were being operated in the area. The loads of wood would then be picked up by 2–5 trucks every night. With a capacity of 6–12 m³ per truck, the two NGOs that carried out this investigation on May 11, 2002, estimated that the illegal logging operations using chainsaws had resulted in the loss of 12–60 m³ of illegally logged wood from Dongi-Dongi. This illegally logged wood can be sold locally for transport to Palu at a price of Rp 400,000 to Rp 450,000 per m³ (the trucks and the workers transporting the wood are paid for by the buyer as well). And once the shipment reaches Palu it can bring as much as Rp 650,000 to Rp 750,000 per m³ (with the buyer also paying for the truck, its driver and other workers).

It is somewhat difficult for the authorities to prove that this loading and transporting of logs is illegal because the people transporting these loads of wood have Permits for Transportation of Logs by Landowners (Ijin Pemungutan Kayu Pada Tanah Milik: IPKTM) and a Certified Forestry Products Document (Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan: SKSHH), which are issued by the Provincial Department of Forestry. The Transportation Permits (IPKTM) issued by the Forestry Department are actually meant for the conveyance of logs from forested areas designated under the "Other Utilization" category, although, in practice, the people holding these Transportation Permits collect log shipments inside the national parks because of the low levels of standing stock existing in the "Other Utilization" areas. Even though this wood originates from shipments out of the national park, it is considered legal if the shipment is covered by a Certified Forestry Products Document (SKSHH). This is because these certification documents can only be issued if the company or institution shipping the wood already has a Transportation Permit.

Therefore, in a letter to the Governor of Central Sulawesi dated March 27, 2002, the Katopasa Foundation requested that the Governor carefully monitor the parties requesting Transportation Permits in the Talabosa, Maholo, Tamadue and other villages in areas adjacent to the Lore Lindu National Park for the sake of the interests of the general public. Besides this, the Katopasa Foundation also protested to the Governor and the Provincial Forestry Department that issued Transportation Permits in Tuwa Village, which shares a border with the Lore Lindu National Park.²⁴

These illegal logging syndicates generally have possession of Transportation Permits and Certified Forestry Products Documents, so the Forest Rangers who check documentation at particular posts – due to limited facilities – usually are not able to effectively investigate the area of origination

of log shipments. Therefore, the logs stolen from various locations in the Lore Lindu National Park flow freely into Palu. Even shipments of logs without the proper documentation get into Palu because this shipping of illegally logged wood is often backed by members of the military and even by Forest Rangers.

It could be said that the widespread incidence of illegal logging in Central Sulawesi is probably caused by three factors. First, the high level of demand for wood in the region's sawmills and wood (carpentry) shops most of which are operating illegally in the Palu valley. A survey carried out by the Park Authority, the Central Sulawesi Regional Police, and Lore Lindu National Park Partnership Forum (FKTNLL) on November 5-15, 2001, found that: (a) of the two molding factories investigated, one was operating without a permit; (b) of the 58 sawmills investigated, 40 had no permits; and (c) of the 77 wood shops checked, 65 had no permits. The results of this survey gave credence to the statements made by the Deputy Head of the Central Sulawesi Forestry Department published in the "Radar Sulteng" newspaper on December 26, 2001. He reported that 95 of 120 units, or 80% of the sawmills in Palu valley did not have the necessary operations document, that being the Plan for the Establishment of Raw Material Processing Industry (Rencana Pengadaan Bahan Baku Industri: RPBI), issued and legalized by the Provincial Forestry Department (Laban, 2002:3).

Second, the weakness of law enforcement. According to Banjar, the legal process for prosecuting cases of log shipments transported without the proper Certified Forestry Products Document (Surat Keterangan Sahnya Hasil Hutan: SKSHH) appeared to be extremely slow, and it was suspected that efforts were being made to hinder or stop the ongoing process. For example, of the 40 cases of illegal shipment of wood monitored from June 27 through December 31, 2001 as of February 2, 2002, only three suspects had been sent for trial by the Police; 5 cases had been turned over to the Donggala Police by the Park Authority, and two of the suspects/cases had been turned over to the Military Police Detachment (Laban, 2002: 7).

Third, the issuance of Transportation Permits (IPKTM) and Certified Forestry Products Documents (SKSHH) by the Provincial Forestry Department was not selective enough; the documents were just too easy to get (Press Release Katopassa Foundation, May 11, 2002). Besides this, Laban indicated that placing the authority for three important support processes (official support/assistance in the exploitation of forestry products, the provision of local licenses and permits, and the implementation of production and monitoring plans) in the hands of the Head of the Provincial

Forestry Department resulted in that official developing the "hedonistic" attitude of a celebrity (Laban, 2002: 3).

This dark portrait of illegal logging in Central Sulawesi is just a miniature picture of the overall extent of this problem occurring in all the nooks and crannies of the Indonesian archipelago in the wake of the economic crisis. The imbalance in the supply and demand of raw materials from the forests due to the over capacity of the wood industry, the weakness of law enforcement, as well as the continuance of corrupt practices, collusion and nepotism, are the main causes of illegal logging in Indonesia (Kartodihardjo, 2002). As a result of these factors, the volume of forestry natural resources lost annually reaches 40 million m³. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the damage to Indonesia's forests – between 1985 and 1998- is severe at a rate of 1.7 million ha annually. In fact, in 2000 the rate of destruction had accelerated to 2 million ha annually. (Ibid, 2002:4).

9. CONCLUSIONS

Basically, the Dongi-Dongi case has its roots in three longstanding factors, all of them caused by the authorities (in this case the actor is the government). The first factor is the weakness of commitment to good governance within the implementation of development programs, in particular the in fulfilling the promise made at the start of the resettlement programs in the 1970s to provide adequate tracts of arable land for farmers. Second, government policies and regulations on the management of certain natural resources, in particular the establishment of conservation areas that did not take into consideration the social-agrarian conditions of the local populace. Third, the past political climate that failed to adequately accommodate or allow social criticism, dialog and communication concerning public policies and regulations which impacted the lives and livelihoods of a large number of people.

The changing political climate in the post Soeharto era immediately facilitated the opening up of space in society for the emergence of political interests and stances, as well as allowing the expression of conflict of opinion in public discourses, all of which came into play in relation to the Dongi-Dongi case. However, once the various segments of society stepped into the wide open space for social discourse, especially as related to the debate over Dongi-Dongi, with various groups taking a pro stance on the occupation of land by the farmers and still others opposing the settlement efforts, within a month of the farmer's occupation of the land, the controversy over this issue had so polarized the stances of the parties involved that each had reached a point of no return in defending their interests.

In such a situation, it must be noted that the presence of both local and international NGOs contributed to the complexity of the efforts at solving the Dongi-Dongi dilemma, which had its origins in the government's low level of commitment, policy failures, and the non-democratic political situation. As it turned out, however, the civil society of Central Sulawesi failed to fully exploit the momentum provided by the more open political climate emerging after the fall of Soeharto's regime. Instead of banding together to cooperatively leverage pressure on the government to take immediate action to improve the living conditions and livelihoods of the landless farmers from the four village communities who occupied Dongi-Dongi, the various interest groups in that region began quarrelling among themselves. Even though each of the opposing groups agreed that the central goal of every campaign, protest and statement issued was to make the government provide alternative land for the landless residents of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat villages, what actually happened was the opening up of huge gaps in communication and agreement among the various parties, in particular the NGOs, local community organizations, and the customary communities of the region. Within three months after the occupation of Dongi-Dongi, the opposing parties in the debate became so preoccupied with defending their positions, mobilizing mass actions in support of their own points of view in both rural and urban areas, demonstrating against each other (with calls even being heard from various quarters for the disbanding of WALHI and YBHR and the closing down of TNC's operations in Palu), making claims of traditional authority, and reporting each other to the police that they all but forgot about working together to defend the rights of the landless farmers in the face of government policy.

At the same time, the provincial and regency level governments began to "withdraw" from the situation as if the authorities were reluctant to become further embroiled in the controversy. This became apparent when the government failed to be ready with a back-up plan for provision of cropland when the farmers occupying Dongi-Dongi rejected the government's offer of alternative land in Manggalapi. The government was totally unprepared to provide land of the same or similar quality to that in Dongi-Dongi (highly fertile, and easy to access with existing transportation facilities).

The rapid "conversion" of forest land into cropland had the side effect of opening up a new economic opportunity in the area – illegal logging. This theft of forest resources could not be avoided in Dongi-Dongi because this illegal activity occurred as a direct result of the structural pressure being brought to bear on the Central Sulawesi forests: (a) excess demand for raw materials on the part of the sawmills and wood shops widely operated illegally

in Palu valley; (b) the weak enforcement of the law, and (c) the ease in getting permits to load and transport raw materials from the forests. Although WALHI and YBHR initially denied the existence of illegal logging activities in Dongi-Dongi, empirical proof eventually indicated that many FPM members had been unable to resist the temptation of the lucrative economic opportunity.

In observation of this situation, it is interesting to analyze further whether the Dongi-Dongi case was solely motivated by the political goal of controlling natural resources in the area, or whether economic motivation played a greater role in what happened there, or, perhaps some combination of political and economic ambitions?

Whatever the motives behind the Dongi-Dongi conflict, the NGOs paid a high price for their involvement. The Dongi-Dongi controversy not only negatively impacted the water catchment function of the area, but also resulted in the polarization of Central Sulawesi's main civil society forces – its NGOs, community organizations, and customary/traditional communities -- which had initially worked together as a harmonious unit in cooperation with the Park Authority for the sustainability of the Lore Lindu National park. From the facts gathered thus far in the analysis of the situation leading to the crisis in Dongi-Dongi, it is apparent that all of the parties to the conflict -- the central government, including the National Park Authority, the regional government, the local and international NGOs, community organizations, and the customary communities -- without exception, contributed on different levels to the Dongi-Dongi dilemma.

10. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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11. GLOSSARY

State Institution & Project

BTNLL.....	<i>Balai Taman Nasional Lore Lindu (Lore Lindu National Park Management Authority)</i>
CSIADCP.....	<i>Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project</i>
DPRD.....	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Provincial People's Representative Assembly)</i>

Gol.....	Government of Indonesia
PHKA.....	<i>Pelestarian Hutan dan Konservasi Alam</i> (Directorate General/DG for Forest Protection & Nature Conservation)
UNTAD.....	Universitas Tadulako (<i>Tadulako University</i>)
Non Government Organization/Village People Organization/Customary Community	
AMAK.....	<i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kamalisi</i> (Alliances for <i>Kamalisi</i> Customary Community, association)
AMAN.....	<i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara</i> (National Alliances for Customary Community, association)
AMASUTA.....	<i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Sulawesi Tengah</i> (Central Sulawesi Alliances for Customary Community, association)
BKKPA Sulteng.....	<i>Badan Koordinasi Kelompok Pencinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah</i> (Nature Lover Coordinating Body Central Sulawesi)
CCA.....	Community Conservation Agreement
CI.....	Conservation International
FKTNLL.....	<i>Forum Kemitraan Taman Nasional Lore Lindu</i> (Partnership Forum for Lore Lindu National Park, association)
FPM.....	<i>Forum Petani Merdeka</i> (Independence Farmer Forum)
GSM.....	<i>Gerakan Sahabat Maleo</i> (Friend of Maleo)
KPA Sulteng.....	<i>Komunitas Pencinta Alam Sulawesi Tengah</i> (Central Sulawesi Nature-Loving Community, association)
LBH Bantaya.....	<i>Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Bantaya</i> (Legal Aid Institute Bantaya)
LBHR.....	<i>Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Rakyat</i> (Legal Aid Institute for People)
NGO.....	Non-Governmental Organization
SNTP.....	<i>Serikat Nelayan Teluk Palu</i> (Palu Bay Fishermen Union)
STN Donggala.....	<i>Serikat Tani Nasional Donggala</i> (National Farmer Union of Donggala)

TNC.....	The Nature Conservancy
WALHI.....	<i>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Forum for Environment, association)
WALHI CS.....	<i>Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia Sulawesi Tengah</i> (The Indonesian Forum for Environment Central Sulawesi, association)
YAKIS.....	<i>Yayasan Katopassa Indonesia</i> (Katopassa Indonesia Foundation)
YBHR.....	<i>Yayasan Bantuan Hukum Rakyat</i> (Legal Aid for People Foundation, NGO)
YPAN.....	<i>Yayasan Pusaka Alam Nusantara</i> (National Heritage Foundation, NGO)
YPR.....	<i>Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat</i> (Foundation for Education of People)
YTM.....	<i>Yayasan Tanah Merdeka</i> (Foundation for Freedom of Land)

International Agency/International Banking

ADB.....	Asian Development Bank
NRM II	Natural Resource Management II (a USAID consortium for natural resource management program)
USAID.....	United States Agency for International Development

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Annex 1. Political Actor according to Its Political Interest, Means/Resource and Conditions

Political Actor	Political Interest	Political Resources/Mean	National & Local Political Conditions
Park Management Authority (BTNLL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Managing and protecting the Park based on conservation law and legal authority Determine and control for access and use of Park resources based on Management Plan (and zonation) Protect sustainability of the Park through the creation of collaborative management with various local communities and stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social capital: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social relations to decision makers at provincial and regency level Social relations to local, national and international NGO Social relations to <i>Lembaga Adat</i> Social relations to international funding/agency Economic capital (Central Government budget for Park management) Support from international NGO (TNC) for strengthening capacity of the Park management ADB (loan) for agriculture and non-farm economic activities of the villages surround the Park (indirect support to Park mission) Use of ideological resources and scientific knowledge in public discourse Lobbying of political and administrative decision-makers Human resource (experience, awareness and competency among 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decentralization & regional autonomy policy Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi The rise of <i>Lembaga Adat</i> among local community in and around the Park facilitating by NGOs

Political Actor	Political Interest	Political Resources/Mean	National & Local Political Conditions
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Park staff) Hardware resource IS, vehicles, post guards, computer/ internet) 	
Local Government (Provincial & Regency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political stability and security of the Central Sulawesi and Donggala District Protect sustainability of the Park by moving Dongi-Dongi settlers to other prospective land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic capital (annual provincial and regency budget) Natural capital (licence & permit for logging and wood base company) Social capital (social relations to various social and economic groups in the region) Local government networks to various Head of Sub-Regency (Camat), Head of village (Ngata) and Regional/Resort Police Mobilization of local government power Support from international funding (ADB) for village development surround national park (CSIADCP) Lobbying of political and administrative decision-maker 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decentralization & regional autonomy policy Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi The rise of <i>Lembaga Adat</i> among local community in and around the Park facilitating by NGOs Money politic culture in various state institutions The Poso unrest
The Nature Conservancy (TNC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To determine access, use and control of Park resources through development of Management Plan (and its zonation) Building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> USAID support for building conservation capacity and partnership at LLNP (USAID/NRM Grant, \$1,370,987) for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Institutional strengthening 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi Strong oppose from local NGOs to international

Political Actor	Political Interest	Political Resources/Mean	National & Local Political Conditions
	<p>institutional capacity of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase environmental awareness among various groups and local community in Central Sulawesi Building conservation networks among various NGOs and local agency 	<p>(\$638,787)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Research & development (\$399,000) Decentralization (\$84,000) Education (\$211,400) Communication (\$23,800) and others (\$14,000) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ADB support (through CSIADCP) for building institutional capacity Park Authority Partnership with various NGOs through FKTNLL and other kind of cooperation Use of ideological resources in the public discourse Use of scientific knowledge in public discourse Lobbying of political and administrative decision-makers Social relations to provincial and regency government office Social relation to several Lembaga Adat and Village Administrations Human resource (experience and competency among local TNC staff) Hardware resources (GPS, GIS, vehicles, 	<p>donor agency (i.e. ADB) and its collaborative networks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The rise of Lembaga Adat among local community in and around the Park facilitating by NGOs Decentralization & regional autonomy policy

Political Actor	Political Interest	Political Resources/Mean	National & Local Political Conditions
		computer /internet)	
Central Sulawesi Integrated Agriculture Development and Conservation Project (CSIADCP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To enhance and protect sustainability of LLNP by lowering risk to Park by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create CCA in all villages surround the Park and Buffer Zone Forum Strengthening agriculture and non-farm economic activities of the villages surround the Park Building institutional capacity Park Authority Increase public service and infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central-provincial-district government institutional network and organizational arrangement for planning, implementing and evaluating the Project Economic capital (ADB loan) for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community development (\$10 million) LLNP and its buffer zone (\$5,2 million); Increase public service and infrastructure (\$14,9 millions); Project management (\$2,3 million) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Decentralization & regional autonomy policy Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi Strong oppose from local NGOs to international donor agency (i.e. ADB) and its collaborative networks Corruption culture in various level of state institutions
Farmers of Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat Village/FPM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To occupy Dongi-Dongi area due to agrarian problems and land scarcity in their villages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong support from WALHI Central Sulawesi, YBHR and YPR Mobilization of Dongi-Dongi settlers for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Farmer organization (Forum Petani Merdeka, FPM) Protest and demonstration Use of press (newspaper and radio) and email 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reformation bring a more democratic sphere to national and local political culture Lack of commitment and political will from provincial and regency government to offer new alternative land

Political Actor	Political Interest	Political Resources/Mean	National & Local Political Conditions
		<p>facilitate by local NGO support Dongi-Dongi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic capital (revenue from farming the new land). One leader strongly indicated involve in illegal logging Social capital (social relations to local NGO support Dongi-Dongi) 	<p>for Dongi-Dongi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak law enforcement Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi Decentralization & regional autonomy policy Poso accident
NGO support Dongi-Dongi occupation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocate landless people from Kamarora A, Kamarora B, Kadidia and Rahmat to occupy Dongi-Dongi Mobilize Dongi-Dongi people and other supporter for public protest (demonstration in front of DPR Province) Press Release and press report Ideological resources (agrarian problems and marginality of people surround national park) Use of scientific knowledge in the public discourse (email for a and seminar) Lobbying member of DPR, provincial level) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic capital (fund raising, NGO fund) Social capital: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social relations among NGO support Dongi-Dongi Social relations to Dongi-Dongi people & customary community Social relations to press/journalist Human capital (capability to advocate local people and organize public protest) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reformation era bring a more democratic sphere to national and local political culture Lack of commitment and political will from provincial and regency government to offer new alternative land for Dongi-Dongi Weak law enforcement Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi Decentralization & regional autonomy policy

Political Actor	Political Interest	Political Resources/Mean	National & Local Political Conditions
NGO oppose Dongi-Dongi occupation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mobilize local people and NGO oppose to Dongi-Dongi for public protest (demonstration in front of DPR Province) Press Release and press report Ideological resources (nature conservation) Use of scientific knowledge in the public discourse (email fora and seminar) Lobbying political and administrative decision maker 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Economic capital (fund raising, NGO fund) Social capital: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Social relations among NGO support Dongi-Dongi Social relations to Dongi-Dongi people Social relations to press/journalist Social relations to Park Authority, TNC and CARE Human capital (capability to advocate local people and organize public protest) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reformation era bring a more democratic sphere to national and local political culture Lack of commitment and political will from provincial and regency government to offer new alternative land for Dongi-Dongi Weak law enforcement Strong NGOs movement in Central Sulawesi Decentralization & regional autonomy policy

Annex 2. CSIADC Project Component and Schedule

Component	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
A. Project Management & Institutional Strengthening																
1. Setup PCU/PIUs																
2. Action plan of project																
3. Project planning management																
4. Monitoring & evaluation survey																
5. Institutional strengthening																
6. Buffer Zone Forum																
B. Community Development																
1. Community Development Process:																
a. Training for Planning and Staff																
b. Distribution of facilitator/coordinator NGO to villages																
2. Community Development Fund																
a. Social Cohesion Grant																
b. Credit Cooperative Matching Fund																
3. Katu Resettlement																
a. Social and environmental study																
b. Preparation of location																
c. Village resettlement																
d. Monitoring																
C. National Park Management & Buffer Zone																
1. Initial preparation (funded by USAID/TNC)																
2. Staff development and training																
3. Development and rehabilitation of National Park facilities																
4. Study on ecology, biodiversity and environment																
5. Border demarcation																
6. Opening and making signs for trails																
7. Ecotourism promotion																
D. Village Supporting Facilities & Infra Structures																
1. Basic service for health																
a. Village sanitation																
b. Health service improvement																
c. Supply of basic medicines																
d. Communication network																
e. Health of birth and baby																
f. Improvement of management and participatory capability																
2. Schistosomiasis Control																
a. Updating data survey																
b. Integration of sectors, seminar & workshop																
c. Early warning system/laboratory rehabilitation																
3. Agriculture production and marketing																
a. Institutional strengthening																
b. Kulawi farming systems survey																
c. Experimentation and demonstration																
d. Establishment of seeding plot																
4. Village Infra Structure																
a. Fresh water supply																
b. Main road, village road and bridge																
c. Wulasa - Puna street																
d. Village implosion system																
e. Micro hydropower units																
f. Strengthen river bank																

Source: Project Coordination Unit - Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project (2002)

Implementation/Construction
 PCU Project Coordinator Unit
 PIU Project Implementation Unit

- One of the important aspects of the Draft Management Plan is the segment on national park zoning. On December 28, 2001, The Nature Conservancy - an international conservation NGO - finished the draft Management Plan for the Lore Lindu National Park. At this moment, the draft management plan is waiting for approval from the Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation.
- In the Statement of Position cited, the Forum Petani Merdeka demanded that: (1) The government provide arable land to landless farmers in the defunct PT. Kebun Sari concession in Dongi-Dongi; (2) The government provide 2 ha of land to each head of household as promised during the implementation of the Local Resettlement and Transmigration Project of 1979 and 1983; (3) The crops cultivated in the Lore Lindu National Park and its surrounding areas by local farmers remain the property of that farming community; (4) All projects funded by foreign funds that were of detriment to the local community must be stopped, and (5) All land distribution must be done in a manner beneficial to the people.
- WALHI is a network organization for Indonesian NGOs Indonesia active in the environmental sector. A Regional Executive for WALHI has been established in almost all of Indonesia's provinces, which functions as a network for regional volunteer organization which are members of WALHI; not all NGOs in a given province are members of WALHI. The Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI currently has a membership of 13 NGOs. At the time of the occupation of Dongi-dongi, YBHR was not a member of WALHI.
- In Section 32 of Regulation No. 5, 1990, it is stated that national park areas are to be managed under a zoning system consisting of a core zone, utilization zone and other zones as need may require. The core zone is defined as a section of the national park, which is absolutely protected from any changes induced by human activities. The main utilization zones in the national park area include recreational and tourist sites. Other zones, outside of those classifications, defined in terms of function and condition, are categorized as specific zones, such as wilderness zone, traditional/customary utilization zone, rehabilitation zone and others.
- On October 20, 1973, 131,000 ha of forest in Biru, Kalamanta and Lore in Poso Regency were designated as the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve by the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No.522/Kpts/U/10/1973. On January 25, 1978, 31,000 ha of forest in Danau Lindu and its surroundings adjacent to the Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Reserve in Donggala Regency were designated as the Danau Lindu Tourism/Protected Area the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No.46/Kpts/U/1978. Three year later, on December 10, 1981, 67,000 ha of forest in Sungai Sopa - Sungai Gumbasa (located in Donggala Regency and Poso Regency) were designated as part of the Lore Lindu Wildlife Reserve under the Decree of the Minister of Agriculture No. 1012/Kpts/U/12/1981. In 1977, UNESCO declared Lore Kalamanta and Danau Lindu forests as Biosphere Reserved areas.
- The first tentative outlines for the zoning of the national park were detailed in the Lore Lindu National Park Management Plans of 1981 and 1995. Zoning was again tried in 1997 (Ministerial Letter No. 135/BKSDA/V/1997), however, was put on hold due to proposed changes to some of the park's boundaries. These changes eventually resulted in the exclusion of two enclave areas from the park, and in the inclusion of the northern "Gumbasa" extension. Zoning planning was made possible once again with the issuance of an information letter from the office of the Minister of Forestry and Plantations Menteri Kehutanan dan Perkebunan, No. 464/Kpts-1/99 (The Nature Conservancy, et al, 2001b: 95).
- Government Regulation of The Republic of Indonesia established under Decree No. 66 of 1998 concerning Natural Sanctuary and Natural Preservation Areas (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 66 Tahun 1998 tentang Kawasan Suaka Alam dan Kawasan Pelestarian Alam).
- According to the Project Administration Memorandum of the CSIADCP (ADB, 1998: 3), USAID/TNC and CSIADCP will collaborate to strengthen the capability of the Park Authority for managing biodiversity conservation and user-friendly service to park visitors, as well as the local community, on matters pertaining to several areas of concern. Those are: (1) Developing and implementing a Five Year Park Management Working Plan; (2) Training Park guards in relation to establishing Park boundaries and an inventory monitoring system; (3) Developing visitor programs and recruiting and training staff and villagers to implement such programs; (4) Conduct inventories and ecological studies as a guide for park zoning for the protection and sustainable use of the forest; (5) Constructing guard posts, staff housing and a visitors' center, rehabilitating existing structures and providing field equipment and vehicles for Park resource monitoring purposes; (6) Constructing new and rehabilitating existing Park trails to improve access to tourist attractions in the Park, as well as to the roads outside the Park. Item components (1), (2) and (3) were funded by USAID/TNC, and item components (4), (5) and (6) were funded by the CSIADC Project.
- Sources: Position Statement Rejecting the Zoning of the Lore Lindu National Park issued by Forum Petani Merdeka, September 12, 2001; commentary and views expressed by Arianto Sangaji in a seminar

Annex 3. NGOs, Associations/Alliances & Community Organizations Involved in Dongi-Dongi Disputes

Actors	Supportive of Dongi-Dongi Occupation (Pro-Occupation)	Opposed to Dongi-Dongi Occupation (Con-Occupation)
International Based NGO		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Nature Conservancy (TNC) CARE Indonesia – Central Sulawesi
Local NGOs and Student Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> People's Legal Aid Foundation (YBHR) Free Land Foundation (YTM) People's Education Foundation (YPR) Palu Bay Fishermen's Union (SNTP) National Farmers Union (STN) Donggala People's Legal Aid Institute LBHR LMND YMPP FNBI SORAK SPRA YMP YEI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LBH Banlaya Katopassa Foundation Green Advocates Jambata Foundation Tadulako Student Nature Lovers (MAPATALA) University of Tadulako Member of BKKPA Member of KPA Central Sulawesi
Associations/Alliances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WALHI Central Sulawesi Central Sulawesi Customary Community Alliance (AMASUTA) Kamalasi Customary Community Alliance (AMAK) Katuvua Alliance Student Nature Lovers Regional Information Center – Central Sulawesi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lore Lindu National Park Partnership Forum (FKTNLL) Nature Lovers Coordinating Body (BKKPA) Central Sulawesi Nature Lovers Community (KPA) Central Sulawesi Kabelosta Singgani Alliance Tolembunga Alliance (a mysterious organization)
Local Communities/Village Administrations/Community Organizations/Customary Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Independent Farmers Forum (FPM) Farmers from Tuva, Pakuli, Bulili, Panimbo, Vatutela, Pandere, Lindu, Sirenja & Dodo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor Farmers Solidarity Forum (FSPM) Pekurehua Customary Community Farmers and Leaders of Rahmat Villages (Head & Secretary of Village, Chief of Customary Council, etc.) Leaders of Sintuwu Village (Head & Secretary of Village, Chief of Customary Council, & other formal & non-formal leaders) Urban Farmers Community Forum Pitungga Ngata Kaili Customary Council

(recording) a presentation paper prepared by Sangagi (2001a, 2001b); letters from the Central Sulawesi Executive for WALHI to the Director General of Forest Conservation and Nature Conservation and to Duncan Neville at the TNC Lore Lindu Field Office; as well as a letter from the Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat to the Governor of Central Sulawesi.

¹⁰ The remains of the base camp and helipad structures are located approximately 200 meters from the Palolo-Napu road.

¹¹ The local people call the road mention the "Japanese Road" because it was constructed under the direction of an engineer from Japan.

¹² PT Kebun Sari got a permit (*Hak Pengusahaan Hutan*: HPH) to exploit specific forest resources within an area of 74,000 ha in Donggala Regency on the basis of Forest Agreement No. FA/N/032/III/1977, dated March 28, 1977 (later extended on the basis of Forest Agreement No. FA/N-AD/008/1/1980, dated January 26, 1980), and Decision Letter No. 41/Kpts/Um/1/1978, dated January 24, 1978 (Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah, 1986: 132).

¹³ Rahmat Village Head Letter No. 44/KDRV/98, dated March 16, 1998, directed to the Governor of Central Sulawesi Province, and stating that Dangaran Village is a village in Marawola Sub-district largely adjacent to Rahmat Village.

¹⁴ From 1993 to the end of February/ first part of March, 1997, the Lore Lindu National Park was managed as a project under the Central Sulawesi Natural Resource Conservation Authority (*Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam*: BKSDA). BKSDA is a Central Sulawesi organization unit responsible for the management of the wildlife refuges and nature preserves within the province of Central Sulawesi besides the Lore Lindu National Park authority itself. Both of these organizations are under the supervision of the central government.

¹⁵ The first Head of the Lore Lindu National Park Authority, Hudyono, an engineer, was sworn into office in September 1997. The Section Level Head, whose position is directly under the Head of the National Park, was appointed in February 1998, and the Head of Sub-Sections was appointed in August 1999.

¹⁶ Based on the Minister of Forestry Decree No. 185/Kpts-II/1997 regarding the Organization and Work Arrangement for the Lore Lindu National Park and the National Park Unit.

¹⁷ Summarized from a number of lectures and presentations which were recorded, such as the Sarasehan meeting and the Central Sulawesi Customary Communities Conference in held on May 16-20, 2000 in Palu; and the Decision Dialogue on Lore Lindu National Park and the (Toi) Behoa People on November 16, 2000, as well as from several articles and documents written by Laban (2000 and 2002a; 2002b).

¹⁸ In 2000, KAU had a membership of 149 NGOs scattered across 22 provinces in Indonesia and 1 NGO from Germany. Among the KAU membership were NGOs active in the fields of hunting, farming, fishing, human rights, the natural environment, law, women's issues, customary communities, youth matters, student issues, and religion.

¹⁹ The NRM/USAID Program was a cooperative arrangement between the governments of the United States Indonesia for the advancement of democratic decentralization in relation to the management of human resources. This program was funded by a grant from the United States Government. In Indonesia, the NRM Program had representative offices in Samarinda, East Kalimantan; Palu, Central Sulawesi; Menado, North Sulawesi; and Jayapura, Papua.

²⁰ The total of 1.030 Heads of households stated by FPM was much higher than the number previously announced. In a meeting at the Assembly building on June 21, 2001, the total of Heads of households was stated as 580.

²¹ Before being set out in a written form in a charter, the contents of The Dongi-dongi Unified Charter for the Management of Natural Resources were discussed with the Head of the National Park in relation to seeking a basis of authority for the release of the Dongi-dongi area to FPM. However, in a statement issued on July 8, 2001, the National Park authorities rejected this possibility by stating: "The National Park has no technical reason or the support of regulations to acknowledge any agreement on conservation, or anything else, from the people who have settled and cultivated land in Dongi-dongi. Besides that, the National Park had no accurate input concerning historical or regional backgrounds to use as a basis for acknowledging any conservation agreement, or anything else from the people who have settled and cultivated land in Dongi-dongi."

²² Interview with Nasir Abas on March 19, 2002.

²³ Slide presentation of the head of the Lore Lindu Park Authority on February 2, 2002.

²⁴ The protest by the Katopassa Foundation was not solely motivated by ecological considerations, but also by the fact that one of the holders of a Transportation Permit (PKTM) was a member of YBHR.